

# Modelling Minimum Wages in a CGE

15 December 2008

Jürgen Wiemers



### Macroeconomic effects of a minimum wage

- Application: Macroeconomic effects of a general minimum wage in Germany
  - $\Rightarrow$  employment, unemployment, wages, fiscal effects, income distribution
- Method: Linked micro-macro model
- Work in progress: Right now, only labour supply effects are accounted for in the linked model.
- $\Rightarrow$  Modelling of the effect of minimum wages on wages and labour demand in the CGE model?

### Minimum wages: Mixed empirical evidence

- Card/Kruger (1995), Neumark/Wascher (2000): USA, ambiguous effects
- Dolado et al. (1996): Europe, sign varies with worker type, overall positive employment effects
- Machin/Wilson (2004), Metcalf (2007): UK, no negative effects
- Abowd (2004): France, negative effects for young low skilled workers and married women



### Minimum wages: Theory

- Efficiency wages (Rebitzer/Taylor 1995; Manning 1995)
- Segmented labour markets/search frictions (Burdett and Mortensen 1989; Manning 2003)
- Wage bargaining (Cahuc et al. 2001)  $\Rightarrow$  approach for modelling minimum wages in the CGE

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# Wage bargaining

PACE-L implementation: Trade unions and firms bargain over wages for each skill type simultaneously (for each sector):

$$\max_{w_{H,s},w_{L,s}} \Omega_s = \pi_s^{(1-\rho_{H,s}-\rho_{L,s})} \Gamma_{H,s}^{\rho_{H,s}} \Gamma_{L,s}^{\rho_{L,s}}, \text{ with}$$
  
$$\Gamma_{i,s} = L_{i,s}^{\chi} \cdot (V_{i,s} - V_{U,i}), \quad i = L, H$$

Cahuc et al. 2001: identical approach, but trade unions represent the interest of skilled workers only:

$$\max_{w_{H,s},w_{L,s}} \Omega_s = \pi_s^{(1-\rho_{H,s})} \Gamma_{H,s}^{\rho_{H,s}} \text{ with}$$
$$\Gamma_{H,s} = L_{H,s}^{\chi} \cdot (V_{H,s} - V_{U,H})$$
s.t.  $w_{L,s} \geq \overline{w_{L,s}}$ 



### Effects of a minimum wage

- Effect of a minimum wage depends on the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour.
- Assumptions:
  - A1: The firms cost function is of the CES type or
  - A2:  $\chi = 0$ .
- Under A1 or A2:

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$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial w_H}{\partial \overline{w_L}} &< 0 \iff \sigma := \frac{\partial \ln \left( L_H / L_L \right)}{\partial \ln \left( \overline{w_L} / w_H \right)} > 1, \\ \frac{\partial L_i}{\partial \overline{w_L}} &< 0 \iff \sigma < 1, \frac{\partial L_i}{\partial \overline{w_L}} \gtrless 0 \iff \sigma > 1, i = H, L, \\ \frac{\partial \left( w_H / \overline{w_L} \right)}{\partial \overline{w_L}} &< 0. \end{aligned}$$



#### Heterogeneity: Sectors and/or workers

- Problem: Representative household vs. wage distribution increase heterogeneity in CGE
- Approach 1: Deeper disaggregation of sectors, 59 instead of 7.
- Approach 2: Decomposing low skilled workers in
  - Low paid low skilled workers  $\Rightarrow w_{LL}$
  - High paid low skilled workers  $\Rightarrow$   $w_{LH} > \overline{w_{LL}}$
  - Wage bargaining over  $w_H$ ,  $w_{LH}$  and  $w_{LL}$  s. t.  $w_{LL} \ge \overline{w_{LL}}$ .

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# Discussion

