Suchprofil: Mindestlohn Durchsuchter Fertigstellungsmonat: 09/10 Sortierung: 1. SSCI-JOURNALS 2. SONSTIGE REFERIERTE ZEITSCHRIFTEN 3. SONSTIGE ZEITSCHRIFTEN 4. ARBEITSPAPIERE/DISCUSSION PAPER 5. MONOGRAPHISCHE LITERATUR 6. BEITRÄGE ZU SAMMELWERKEN **************** 1. SSCI-JOURNALS **************** @Article{Kaufman:2010:IEA, Journal= {Industrial and Labor Relations Review}, Volume= {63}, Number= {3}, Author= {Bruce E. Kaufman}, Title= {Institutional economics and the minimum wage : broadening the theoretical and policy debate}, Year= {2010}, Pages= {427-453}, ISBN= {ISSN 0019-7939}, Abstract= {"Debate among labor economists on the pros and cons of a minimum wage law has come to focus on whether labor markets are competitive or monopsonistic. The purpose of this paper is, first, to suggest that this perspective is too narrow and, second, to use principles and concepts of institutional economics to demonstrate why. In particular, I use institutional theory to develop four theoretical rationales for minimum wage legislation: imperfect competition and inequality of bargaining power; involuntary unemployment and destructive competition; efficiency and growth; and labor market externalities and social costs of labor. One revisionist implication is that a minimum wage under plausible conditions may increase economic efficiency even in a purely competitive labor market." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: Mindestlohnrecht; Mindestlohn; Institutionenökonomie; Arbeitsmarkttheorie; Wettbewerbstheorie; Beschäftigungseffekte; }, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {IAB-Sign.: Z 680}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100811n03}, } @Article{Koeniger:2007:LMI, Journal= {Industrial and Labor Relations Review}, Volume= {60}, Number= {3}, Author= {Winfried Koeniger and Marco Leonardi and Luca Nunziata}, Title= {Labor market institutions and wage inequality}, Year= {2007}, Pages= {340-356}, ISBN= {ISSN 0019-7939}, Annote= {URL: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1282&context=ilrreview}, Abstract= {"The authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance, unions, firing regulations, and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers. Results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven OECD countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can account for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998. Factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density, the strictness of employment protection law, unemployment benefit duration, unemployment benefit generosity, and the size of the minimum wage. Over the 26-year period, institutional changes were associated with a 23% reduction in male wage inequality in France, where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but with an increase of up to 11% in the United States and United Kingdom, where unions became less powerful and (in the United States) minimum wages fell." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: institutionelle Faktoren; Arbeitsmarktpolitik; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Kündigungsschutz; Mindestlohnrecht; Gewerkschaft; Einkommenseffekte - internationaler Vergleich; Lohnunterschied; erwerbstätige Männer; ; Australien; Kanada; Finnland; Frankreich; Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Italien; Japan; Niederlande; Schweden; Großbritannien; USA; ; }, Annote= {Bezugszeitraum: A 1973; E 1998}, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {IAB-Sign.: Z 680}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100826n07}, } ************************************ 2. SONSTIGE REFERIERTE ZEITSCHRIFTEN ************************************ @Article{Fanti:2010:EGA, Journal= {Labour}, Volume= {24}, Number= {3}, Author= {Luciano Fanti and Luca Gori}, Title= {Economic growth and welfare in a neoclassical overlapping generations growth model with minimum wages and consumption taxes}, Year= {2010}, Pages= {238-262}, ISBN= {ISSN 1121-7081}, Abstract= {"We examine the effects of minimum wages on both the long-run per worker GDP and welfare in the textbook Diamond style overlapping generations economy. In addition, we assume the existence of unemployment benefits financed at a balanced budget with consumption taxes. Under suitable conditions, it is shown that a regulated-wage economy with unemployment performs better than a competitive-wage economy with full employment in the long run. Moreover, a welfare-maximizing minimum wage exists. Our findings may have interesting policy implications." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: Mindestlohn - Auswirkungen; Arbeitsmarktmodell; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Steuern; Wirtschaftswachstum; Bruttoinlandsprodukt; Einkommenshöhe; }, Annote= {JEL-Klassifikation: E24, H24, O41}, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {IAB-Sign.: Z 930}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100831n06}, } ********************************** 4. ARBEITSPAPIERE/DISCUSSION PAPER ********************************** @Book{Addison:2010:MWL, Institution={Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, Bonn (Hrsg.)}, Author= {John T. Addison and Orgul Demet Ozturk}, Title= {Minimum wages, labor market institutions, and female employment and unemployment : a cross-country analysis}, Year= {2010}, Pages= {32}, Address= {Bonn}, Series= {IZA discussion paper}, Number= {5162}, Annote= {URL: http://doku.iab.de/externe/2010/k100908r01.pdf}, Abstract= {"This paper estimates the effect of minimum wage regulation in 16 OECD countries, 1970-2008. Our treatment is motivated by Neumark and Wascher's (2004) seminal cross-country study using panel methods to estimate minimum wage effects among teenagers and young adults. Apart from the longer time interval examined here, a major departure of the present study is the focus on prime-age females, a group typically neglected in the component minimum wage literature. Another is our deployment of time-varying policy and institutional regressors. Yet another is our examination of unemployment and participation outcomes in addition to employment effects. We report strong evidence of adverse employment effects among adult females and lower participation, even if the unemployment effects are muted. Although we report some similar findings to Neumark and Wascher as to the role of labor market institutions and policies, we do not observe the same patterns in the institutional data; in particular, we can reject for our target group their finding of stronger disemployment effects in countries with the least regulated markets." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: Mindestlohn - Auswirkungen; Berufsanfänger; erwerbstätige Frauen; Frauenerwerbstätigkeit - internationaler Vergleich; Frauen; Arbeitslosigkeit; institutionelle Faktoren; OECD; Australien; Belgien; Bundesrepublik Deutschland; Dänemark; Finnland; Frankreich; Großbritannien; Irland; IItalien; Japan; Kanada; Neuseeland; Niederlande; Schweden; Spanien; USA; }, Annote= {Bezugszeitraum: A 1970; E 2008}, Annote= {JEL-Klassifikation: J20; J38; J48; J58; J88}, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100908r01}, } @Book{Dittrich:2010:WAE, Institution={CESifo GmbH, M{\"u}nchen (Hrsg.)}, Author= {Marcus Dittrich and Andreas Knabe}, Title= {Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages}, Year= {2010}, Pages= {28}, Address= {M{\"u}nchen}, Series= {CESifo working paper}, Number= {3149}, Annote= {URL: http://doku.iab.de/externe/2010/k100811r08.pdf}, Abstract= {"Common wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such minimum wages can drive up wages - and be harmful to employment - when bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: Mindestlohn - Auswirkungen; Einkommenseffekte; Beschäftigungseffekte; Tarifverhandlungen; Nash, John; Mindestlohn; }, Annote= {JEL-Klassifikation: J38; C78; J52}, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100811r08}, } *************************** 6. BEITRÄGE ZU SAMMELWERKEN *************************** @Incollection{Boockmann:2010:CEE, Editor= {Klaus F. Zimmermann and Christian Wey}, Booktitle= {The economy, crises, and the labor market : can institutions serve as a protective shield for employment?}, Author= {Bernhard Boockmann}, Title= {The combined employment effects of minimum wages and labor market regulation : a meta-analysis}, Year= {2010}, Pages= {167-186}, Address= {Berlin}, Publisher= {Duncker und Humblot}, Series= {Applied Economics Quarterly Supplement}, Number= {61}, ISBN= {ISBN 978-3-428-83439-6}, Abstract= {"This paper provides a meta-analysis of 55 empirical studies estimating the employment effects of minimum wages in 15 industrial countries. It strongly confirms the notion that the effects of minimum wages are heterogeneous between countries. As possible sources of heterogeneity, it considers the benefit replacement ratio, employment protection and the collective bargaining system. While the results are in line with theoretical expectations, the degree to which they are robust differs across these institutions." (author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))}, Annote= {Schlagwörter: Mindestlohn; Regulierung; Tarifverhandlungen; Lohnstruktur; Einkommensverteilung; Mindestlohnrecht; Beschäftigungssicherung; Beschäftigungseffekte; ; Industrieländer; ; }, Annote= {Sprache: en}, Annote= {Quelle: IAB, SB Dokumentation und Bibliothek, LitDokAB, k100923n05}, } 6 von 409 Datensätzen ausgegeben.