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IAB Kontaktseminar Regensburg, November 2004

"New economic geography"

- "Positive" model:
 - → Derivation of geographical equilibrium structures
- Increasing returns to scale + transportation costs
 + factor mobility
 - → Endogenous emergence of a centre-periphery-structure in a model with two regions that are ex-ante indentical.

"New economic geography"

Normative issue:
 What are the welfare implications of these equilibria?

 NEG: Imperfect competition
 → First theorem of welfare economics not always valid!

- Second most important policy area in the EU (~30 billion Euro p.a.)
- Goal of EU regional policy: Reduction of agglomeration
- Not a policy of income redistribution, but rather: policy that aims at influencing the spatial resource allocation

"Durch die explizite Nennung des Ziels der Verringerung der Unterschiede im Entwicklungsstand in Bezug auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung wird implizit gefordert, dass die EU-Politik und insbesondere die Kohäsionspolitik die Faktorausstattung und die Ressourcenallokation beeinflussen sollen, um dadurch das wirtschaftliche Wachstum zu fördern. [...] Es geht weniger darum, den Verbrauch direkt zu erhöhen oder das Einkommen umzuverteilen."

(Second Cohesion Report of the EU Commission, 2001)

- When is regional policy justified from an efficiency point of view?
 - → Decentralized market allocations must exhibit "over-agglomeration".
- What is "over-agglomeration"? → markets generate more spatial inequality than a "benevolent social planner"

- With "over-agglomeration": Justification for EU regional policy
- With optimal or "under-agglomeration" compensating income transfers, but no reason to influence spatial resource allocation

NEG and normative analysis

- Problem: Most models can only be solved numerically.
- Normative analysis based on analytically tractable NEG models:

Ottaviano/Thisse, JPubEcon, 2002 Ottaviano/Tabuchi/Thisse, IER, 2002 Pflüger/Suedekum, IZA, 2004

NEG-Modell

- Two ex-ante identical regions
- Two sectors: "Industry" (M) and "agriculture" (A)
- Two types of individuals
 -- unskilled (regionally immobile, sectorally mobile), L
 -- skilled (only in M-sector, regionally mobile), K
- Immobile housing stock (H)
- H and L distributed evenly across the two regions

NEG model


- A-sector: CRS, perfect competition, free tradability.
 1 unit labour = 1 product unit
- M-sector: Dixit-Stiglitz variety of differentiated products; one product per firm IRS + monopolistic competition + interregional transportation costs.

One skilled worker per firm as fixed cost; constant marginal costs (unskilled only)

Demand

Utility function

$U = \alpha \ln X + \beta \ln H + A$



Decision problem for skilled workers: Agglomeration in one region, or remaining in the symmetrical initial situation?

Agglomeration versus dispersion forces

Agglomeration forces:

- Market size effects:
 - -- higher nominal wages +
 - -- lower price index for M-goods


Dispersion forces:

- Stronger product and factor market competition with regional concentration
 - -- downward pressure on nominal wages
- Higher housing prices


Agglomeration forces > Dispersion forces: Centre-periphery-structure. Skilled workers concentrate in on region.

Agglomeration forces < Dispersion forces: Symmetrical equilibrium remains


Critical determinant: Transportation costs




Secularly falling trade costs



For comparison: Krugman (1991)



Pflueger/Suedekum (2004)



Is the equilibrium allocation always identical with the optimal (planner-)allocation?

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\rightarrow NO!

Mobile skilled workers neglect the impact of their location decision on the welfare level of the immobile unskilled workers! (transmission mechanism: market prices)

A planner would take these effects into account.

Planner chooses λ such that:

$$\Omega(\lambda) = \sum_{i \in \{A,A^*,K\}} V_i(p,Y_i) \rightarrow Max!$$

"utilitarian social welfare function"


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Critical determinant: level of trade




Equilibrium allocation

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Planner allocation

Comparison of the two: Implications for the efficiency reasons for regional policy



Efficiency reasons for regional policy

- Over-agglomeration only in a certain range of trade costs.
- In other ranges: Market generates optimal degree, or even "too little" agglomeration

Policy implications

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- From an efficiency point of view: A more equal spatial resource allocation is by no means always justified.
- But a policy like this is justified in certain parameter ranges.

Policy implications: Outlook

- Problem 1: Do all theoretical models produce the same qualitative results?
- Problem 2: Even if so, in which parameter range are we?