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18|2024 Six years after the EU-Turkey Agreement: A quantitative assessment of the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey

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Six years after the EU-Turkey Agreement: A quantitative assessment of the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey

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The IAB Research Reports (IAB-Forschungsberichte) series publishes larger-scale empirical analyses and project reports, often with heavily data- and method-related content.

In brief

- Syrians in Turkey are on average younger and less educated than their Turkish hosts. 24 percent of Syrian women and 19 percent of Syrian men never attended school or left school without a certificate.

- They seldomly participate in education in Turkey. Independent of their duration of stay, Syrians are instead often in employment.

- The majority of Syrian children up to the age of 15 is attending school. This share drops from 85 to 55 percent for the 16 to 18-year-olds.

- Just like most women worldwide, Syrian women bear the largest chunk of unpaid household labour and carework. At the same time, 39 percent of the Syrian women are in paid jobs.

- With 60 percent of Syrians in Turkey being in paid jobs, their employment rate resembles that of refugees in Germany. Syrians in Turkey, however, typically work in daily work schemes and are to a large extent informally employed.

- These precarious working conditions are reflected in their high probability to live in poverty. A third of the surveyed Syrian households are not able to afford food and another third cannot afford other basic goods with their income.

- Nevertheless, they report fairly high levels of life satisfaction and health.

- The majority of Syrians would like to leave Turkey, but only a small share (7 percent) has made concrete plans to do so.

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Summary

According to the German Federal Statistical Office, 2.9 million people in Germany had a Turkish migration background in 2022. Thus, Turkey represents one of the most important countries of origin for migrants in Germany. In the last decade, however, Turkey has also become an important transit and destination country for migrants itself. Since 2011, when war broke out in Syria, more than 3.7 million Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey. Starting in 2014, Turkey's initial open-door immigration policy increasingly gave way to restrictive measures with the goal to limit migration from Syria. Following a German initiative, the European Union (EU) and the Turkish government agreed on a migration agreement in 2016. The EU-Turkey agreement aimed at limiting irregular migration to the EU and, in turn, improving the humanitarian conditions for refugees in Turkey by providing 6 billion Euros in aid.

In this research report, we examine the living conditions, well-being, and socio-economic participation of Syrian refugees in Turkey compared to the Turkish host society in 2022, six years after the EU-Turkey agreement. We make use of the comprehensive longitudinal data infrastructure that was created as part of the TRANSMIT project in cooperation between IAB and the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM, Humboldt University Berlin). This report relies on wave 2 of the TRANSMIT Turkey survey conducted in December 2021 and January 2022. The structured survey of equal numbers of Syrians and Turks (1250 respondents each) enables us to compare the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey with those of the Turkish majority population. The findings indicate that the living conditions, well-being and participation of Syrian refugees in Turkey remain precarious despite the EU-Turkey agreement. For example, in 2022, roughly one third of the Syrian respondents report that their income does not cover food, another third cannot afford other basic necessities. Despite an average length of stay of 8 years, more than two-thirds of Syrian workers are employed as day laborers. The majority of employment is irregular and involves manual, often physically demanding work such as construction or agriculture. Similar to the situation of refugees in Germany, there is a strong gender gap in the labour market, but the overall level of employment for Syrians in Turkey is higher. 39 percent of the Syrian women and 79 percent of the Syrian men are in paid employment. Women furthermore provide most of the unpaid household labour and carework. Participation in education remains low, with a total of 7 percent of adult respondents having attended or currently attending school at the time of the survey. Men are more likely to participate in education than women. We attribute the relatively high labour market participation and the low educational participation to the fact that Syrians in Turkey do not have systematic access to social security and childcare, apart from EU-funded emergency programs. Similarly, language classes are not systematically available for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Turkish language proficiency increases moderately from 47 percent after 5 or less years of residence to 63 percent after 10 or more years of residence. This upward trend in language skills is mostly driven by Syrian women. The educational participation of Syrian children is much more comprehensive: 85 percent of the 6- to 15-year-olds are attending school. This success can in part be attributed to the respective EU support. We also examine the aspirations and concrete plans of Syrian refugees to leave Turkey. A quarter of the Syrians interviewed in 2022 would like to leave Turkey. Germany is most frequently mentioned as the preferred destination. However, only a small share

(7 percent) of those with migration intentions actually have concrete plans to emigrate in the next 12 months. The most prominent reasons to stay are children currently in education, a lack of financial resources and the wish to stay with the family. Among Syrians with social networks abroad, the proportion with concrete plans to emigrate is even lower. This underscores the hypothetical nature of the migration aspirations that we measured in the TRANSMIT surveys.

Zusammenfassung

2,9 Millionen Personen in Deutschland hatten im Jahr 2022 laut dem Statistischen Bundesamt einen türkischen Migrationshintergrund. Somit stellt die Türkei seit Jahrzehnten eins der wichtigsten Herkunftsländer von Migrant*innen in Deutschland dar. Im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich die Türkei allerdings selbst zu einem wichtigen Transit- und Zielland für Zugewanderte entwickelt. Seit 2011, dem Beginn des Krieges in Syrien, haben mehr als 3,5 Millionen Syrerinnen und Syrer Zuflucht in der Türkei gesucht. Die zunächst offen gestaltete türkische Einwanderungspolitik wich ab 2014 zunehmend Maßnahmen, die Zuwanderung aus Syrien zu begrenzen. Vorangetrieben von Deutschland beschlossen die Europäische Union (EU) und die türkische Regierung im Jahr 2016 ein Rückübernahmeabkommen. Das EU-Türkei-Abkommen verfolgte das Ziel, irreguläre Migration in die EU zu begrenzen und im Gegenzug die humanitären Bedingungen für Geflüchtete in der Türkei durch Hilfsgelder in Milliardenhöhe zu verbessern.

In diesem Forschungsbericht untersuchen wir die Lebensumstände, das Wohlergehen und die Teilhabe syrischer Geflüchteter in der Türkei im Vergleich zur türkischen Aufnahmegesellschaft im Jahr 2022, sechs Jahre nach dem EU-Türkei-Deal. Wir greifen dabei auf die umfassende längsschnittlich angelegte Dateninfrastruktur zurück, die im Rahmen des TRANSMIT-Projekts in Kooperation von IAB und dem Berliner Institut für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung (BIM, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) geschaffen wurde. Die strukturierte Befragung von syrischen und türkischen Personen zu gleichen Teilen (je 1250 Befragte) ermöglicht es, die Lebensumstände von Syrerinnen und Syrern in der Türkei mit denen der türkischen Mehrheitsgesellschaft ins Verhältnis zu setzen. Die Auswertungen weisen darauf hin, dass die Lebensbedingungen, das Wohlergehen und die Teilhabe von syrischen Geflüchteten in der Türkei sich trotz des EU-Türkei-Deals prekär gestalten. So berichtet im Jahr 2022 ein Drittel der syrischen Befragten, dass ihr Einkommen nicht für Essen ausreicht. Ein weiteres Drittel kann sich mit ihrem Einkommen nicht alle nötigen Produkte der Grundversorgung leisten. Unter den syrischen Beschäftigten sind trotz einer durchschnittlichen Aufenthaltsdauer von 8 Jahren über zwei Drittel als Tagelöhner beschäftigt. Die Mehrzahl der Beschäftigungsverhältnisse sind irregulär und stellen manuelle, häufig körperlich anspruchsvolle Tätigkeiten wie im Baugewerbe oder der Landwirtschaft dar. Ähnlich wie bei Geflüchteten in Deutschland zeigt sich ein starker Gender Gap auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, allerdings befindet sich die syrische Beschäftigung in der Türkei insgesamt auf einem höheren Niveau. 39 Prozent der syrischen Frauen und 79 Prozent der syrischen Männer gehen einer bezahlten Erwerbstätigkeit nach. Frauen leisten gleichzeitig den Großteil der Haushalts- und Sorgearbeit. Die Bildungsbeteiligung bleibt mit insgesamt 7 Prozent aller erwachsenen Befragten, die zum Zeitpunkt der Befragung eine Schule besucht oder abgeschlossen haben, gering. Auch hier haben Männer eine höhere Teilhabewahrscheinlichkeit

als Frauen. Wir führen die vergleichsweise hohe Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung und die geringe Bildungsbeteiligung darauf zurück, dass für Syrer*innen in der Türkei neben den EU-finanzierten Notfallprogrammen kein systematischer Zugang zu sozialer Sicherung und Kinderbetreuungsangeboten besteht. Dieser wirtschaftliche Druck spiegelt sich auch in den nur moderat steigenden Anteilen von Syrer*innen mit guten Türkischkenntnissen wider: liegt er bei 5 oder weniger Jahren Aufenthaltsdauer bei 47 Prozent, steigt er nach 10 oder mehr Jahren Aufenthaltsdauer auf 63 Prozent. Anders verhält es sich mit dem Bildungszugang für syrische Kinder und Jugendliche: 85 Prozent der syrischen 6 bis 15-Jährigen besuchen eine Schule. Dieser Erfolg kann unter anderem auch auf gezielte EU- Fördermaßnahmen zurückgeführt werden.

Wir untersuchen auch die Absichten und die konkreten Möglichkeiten von syrischen Geflüchteten, die Türkei zu verlassen. Ein Viertel der in 2022 befragten Syrer*innen wünscht sich, die Türkei zu verlassen. Deutschland stellt das am häufigsten genannte Wunschzielland dar. Nur ein kleiner Anteil (7 Prozent) der Personen mit Migrationsabsichten hat aber tatsächlich konkrete Pläne, die Weiterwanderung in den nächsten 12 Monaten umzusetzen. Begründet wird dies meist mit Kindern in Bildung, mit fehlenden finanziellen Ressourcen und damit, bei der Familie bleiben zu wollen. Bei Personen mit sozialen Kontakten im Ausland ist der Anteil mit konkreten Weiterwanderungsplänen noch geringer. Dies unterstreicht den hypothetischen Charakter der Migrationsabsichten, die wir in den TRANSMIT-Befragungen messen konnten.

Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

According to the German Federal Statistical Office, 2.9 million residents in Germany had a Turkish migration background in 2023.[1] Turkey thus represents one of the major sending countries of migrants in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2024). In the last decade, however, Turkey transformed into a major country of transit and destination for millions of individuals. Since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011, more than 3.7 million Syrians sought refuge in Turkey (UNHCR, 2024). Initially, Turkey took a welcoming stance towards them. Starting in 2014, the fairly open immigration policy has increasingly given way to measures aimed at restricting Syrian immigration. Partial border closures and the construction of a 900-km wall along the border with Syria marked the end of Turkey's open-door policy for Syrians which had previously received international praise (Gokalp Aras and Sahin Mencutek, 2019). The 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) introduced a particular protection title for Syrians, granting them access to healthcare and social services. But it also cemented their legal status as temporary and closed doors to permanent residence permits or citizenship (Baban et al., 2017). Access to formal work permits was heavily restricted, increasing incentives to enter the informal workforce. Most importantly, Syrians could only apply for work permits and access services in the region of residence in which they were first registered, restricting their mobility within Turkey. Also, being issued a work permit led to the loss of eligibility to social benefits for the entire family.

Based on the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement on the return of refugees, social benefit provisions for at-risk Syrian refugees in Turkey are financed by money transfers from the European Union (EU). The agreement aimed at limiting irregular migration to the EU and, in return, improve humanitarian conditions for refugees in Turkey. Turkey received 6 billion Euros to support the provision of goods and services in the domains of employment, livelihood, education, and health care access to the displaced populations, primarily Syrians, in Turkey (Ruhnke, 2021).

Already at the time the EU-Turkey agreement was heavily criticized for its violation of asylum rights and the instrumentalization of refugees (e.g. Düvell et al., 2020). How did the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey play out six years after the EU-Turkey agreement, and how pronounced were intentions to migrate onwards? In this research report, we examine the living conditions, well-being, and socioeconomic participation patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2022. In this context, we also analyse the intentions and concrete plans of Syrians to leave Turkey (e.g. for the EU). We draw on the comprehensive longitudinal data infrastructure that was created as part of the TRANSMIT project in cooperation between IAB and the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research (BIM, Humboldt University Berlin). The structured survey sampled Syrian and Turkish individuals in equal numbers (1250 respondents each), such that the living conditions of Syrians in Turkey can be compared with those of their Turkish neighbors.

The results indicate that the living conditions and the participation patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey at the time were precarious. Despite an employment rate of 60 percent among Syrian respondents in 2022, almost a third reported that their income was not sufficient for food. Another third of the respondents could not cover other basic needs. Among Syrian workers, more

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[1] This includes individuals born in Turkey and individuals whose parents were born in Turkey.

than two-thirds were employed as day labourers. Almost nine in ten employment schemes were of informal nature. Participation rates and job quality did not visibly change with duration of stay in the country. We furthermore find moderate but stagnating Turkish proficiency, particularly for Syrian men, and an overall low educational participation. We attribute this primarily to economic pressure given a lack of social security policies and of long-term integration perspectives. In contrast to restrictive or absent labour market and social protection policies, registered Syrians are granted free access to healthcare (within their province of residence) and display relatively good health outcome. Major access barriers, however, also remain in the field of health, particularly for non-registered Syrians. At the same time, only a small share (7 percent) had concrete plans of onward migration.

The examinations firstly illustrate that results for the livelihood of Syrians need to be contextualized with the livelihood of the Turkish society to understand whether the low living standards of Syrians reflect the overall living conditions in Turkey or whether Syrians in Turkey are particularly disadvantaged. Based on this data setup, we secondly conclude on a markedly precarious livelihood and low markers of structural integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey. This comes despite the EU-Turkey agreement which aimed at improving their living conditions in Turkey. Finally, there were widespread concerns of a large-scale Syrian onward migration into the EU among policymakers and the public in potential destination countries such as Germany. We find that for the observed period, desires to leave Turkey remained a prevalent but hypothetical idea and seldomly translated into concrete travel plans.

2 Data

Together with Yöntem Research Consultancy, TRANSMIT conducted quantitative panel surveys among the Syrian population in Turkey, as well as their Turkish neighbors (hereinafter also referred to as "host population"). This report analyzes data from the second wave which was the most recent data set by the time of drafting this report. Also, data irregularities in wave 2 led us to develop more effective data cleaning procedures which are presented in this report (2.4). The second wave was conducted between December 5, 2021, and January 25, 2022. The original sample size is 2,521 respondents. One interview was dropped for data protection reasons. 32 Syrian interviewees had arrived to Turkey before the onset of the war in Syria and were dropped from the recent analysis that focuses in particular on Syrian refugees. Three panelists were dropped which showed inconsistencies in terms of gender and age with their first interview in wave 1. 304 interviews were dropped for assumed fraud in the data collection process. With 302 deleted interviews, this disproportionally affected the Syrian sample, rendering a sample size of 2,216 respondents (Syrians: N = 976, Turkish: N = 1,240). See 2.4 for details on the deletion of interviews due to assumed fraud. Data were collected in 20 municipalities across all Turkish NUTS1 regions (see 2.3).

2.1 Survey structure

The survey was conducted by means of Computer Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI), based on a structured questionnaire available in Arabic and Turkish. Interviewers were native speakers of either Arabic or Turkish and trained in CAPI use. 177 interviewers were in the field, with 102 running interviews in the Syrian strata only. 24 interviewers were active in both strata. The average median interview duration was 40 minutes. The surveys include a wide range of demographic (age, gender, family structure) and socioeconomic (education, income, employment, well-being) characteristics. In addition, questions about individual migration intentions, experiences and networks, general (mental) health, and experiences of discrimination are part of the survey. An additional module on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic was added for the survey wave presented in this report. In addition to the main questionnaire collecting individual information on the respondent, basic demographic information on household members (N=11,052) and family members outside the household (N=5,301) was collected. We use this data to inquire details of the household and family situation. In particular, incomplete information on children in the main questionnaire was substituted with information from these rosters. In addition, for 64 households, more children were reported in the family and household rosters than in the main questionnaire. In these cases, data from the rosters was used to replace child information from the main questionnaire.

2.2 Target population

The target population included Syrian and Turkish individuals with a minimum age of 15 years who were in Turkey at the time of the initial survey in 2021 and who were living in private housing (e.g. no prison, barracks, or formal camps). The survey targeted the Syrian population residing in Turkey at the time of data collection as well as the host population living in the same neighborhoods. To that end, the survey was stratified by country of birth of the head of household such that 50 percent of respondents were from Syrian households and 50 percent were from non-Syrian households.

Established as a longitudinal survey, wave 2 data collections in 2022 re-ran interviews with wave 1 respondents. Interviewers visited each wave 1 household at the saved address in a maximum of three attempts. 20 percent of the Syrian sample and 26 percent of the host sample in wave 1 could be re-contacted for the second wave of data collections[2]. To reach the targeted sample size of 2,500 respondents, additional households were recruited following the same sampling strategy as for the initial respondents (called "refreshment sample" in the following). The high attrition rates can be attributed to respondents' refusal to participate again (68 percent of dropouts). Another 30 percent was not encountered at the saved address: according to information provided by neighbours or other informed persons, the majority of these households has moved away. This points at a high mobility of the surveyed population - both Syrians and hosts - which may be fueled by high inflation and rising rent costs at the time of the survey. See Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for further details on non-response.

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[2] excluding cases of suspected fraud, see 2.4.

2.3 Sampling strategy

The survey targeted a representative sample of Syrians in Turkey and an equally large Turkish sample in the same neighborhoods as a (non-representative) comparison group. Since no reliable registry data for the Syrian population in Turkey was available, the selection of respondents took place through multilevel area sampling combined with the random walk method. Based on publicly available aggregate data on the distribution of the Syrian population, the districts (cf. counties) with the highest and second highest Syrian population shares were selected in each region (cf. states) of Turkey. This increases cost efficiency of the survey and is commonly done for hard-to-reach population samples which require random walk sampling due to a lack of registry data (Bauer, 2014; Thomson et al., 2020).[3] Within these districts, neighborhoods were again randomly selected as Primary Sampling Units (PSU). The selection of respondents took place via random walk. For this, interviewers walked the streets in the selected neighborhood according to predetermined walking rules to select households for participation (see Bauer, 2014, for details on this procedure). Within the households that agreed to participate the choice of the interviewee is also randomized (within age requirements). If the random walk in the respective neighborhoods did not yield sufficient observations, the survey continued in previously defined alternative neighborhoods until the respective quota of Syrian and Turkish respondents was met. Importantly, this procedure results in a skewed Turkish sample towards the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum given the oversampling of Turkish respondents in areas with a high Syrian presence.

The re-contacting of the participants of the previous surveys took place based on the addresses at which the previous interview had taken place. If the interviewees could not be reached, two further visits were carried out at intervals of a few days. If the contact attempt remained unsuccessful, the survey company tried to reach respondents by telephone and arrange an interview appointment if telephone data had been provided in the previous wave. If still unsuccessful or if the respondent declined to participate in the study again, the contact attempts were discontinued, and the respondents' contact data were permanently deleted.

2.4 Data cleaning: implausible data

During the standard quality controls and in preparation of the next wave, some irregular patterns in the data were observed. Given the difficulty of the interviewers' job (in our case, following random route instructions, contacting respondents, convincing respondents to participate, conducting the actual interview) and the incentives to save time and effort, fraudulent behaviour among interviewers or survey companies is not uncommon (Schwanhäuser et al., 2022). Incidences of data fabrication trouble even internationally well-known surveys such as the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey (Blasius and Thiessen, 2012, 2021). In our surveys, we detected an uncommonly high similarity of some interviews, which led us to systematically check the survey data for statistical irregularities. To test the suspicions, we firstly ran the statistical tests suggested by Schwanhäuser et al. (2022). Their indicators target the identification of fully fabricated interviews. Applied to our survey data, the indicators did not deliver a coherent

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[3] It is important to note that the decision to sample in districts with high Syrian population shares affects the composition of the Turkish sample. We assume a slight downward bias in terms of educational profiles and socioeconomic background.

picture of fraud. Most indicators did not show the expected outcomes and did not confirm systematically different response patterns for the suspicious interviewers. In addition, the callbacks to respondents carried out as standard quality controls did not detect non-existing interviewees. We thus ruled out the assumption that our survey data suffers from full fabrication of interviews and instead tested the option of partial data manipulation by single interviewers.

Given the high similarity we occasionally found between interviews, we calculated and examined the maximum matching rates of interviews in (near-)duplicate analyses.[4] The maximum match for each interview denotes the maximum proportion of responses identical to any other interview in the sample. We found seven interviewers who had average matching rates of their interviews of 80 percent or higher.[5] In total, these seven interviewers conducted 294 interviews. Having a closer look at these interviews, we identified answer patterns that are referred to as straightlining or nondifferentiation in the literature (Schwanhäuser et al., 2022). This response pattern refers to very low variation within the answers of one item battery. To be precise, our questionnaire contained seven item batteries using standardized 5- or 7-scaled answer options (e.g., "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" in seven steps). Three out of the seven interviewers who showed suspicious patterns in the duplicate analysis had suspiciously straightlined answers on these item batteries in their interviews. In other words, in at least six out of the seven item batteries the answers took the same value within each battery, e.g. the middle category stating "neither agree nor disagree". This unlikely scenario supports the assumption that some interviewers skipped items during the interview and instead randomly entered an answer to save time.

To corroborate this hypothesis, we checked further indicators of fraudulent time-saving behaviour by interviewers: firstly, the manipulation of answers such that filters are activated which reduce the amount of follow-up questions (Eckman et al. 2014). Relatedly, when entering information on household and family members, concealing some persons saves time. We therefore secondly consulted the average number of reported network members per interviewer. Thirdly, if the partial fabrication of interviews is a matter of saving time and resources, then fraudulent interviewers can be expected to get their workload done more quickly. We therefore scrutinized the number of completed interviews per day. On the interview level, we furthermore checked the number of triggered follow-up questions. Uncommonly low numbers of triggered follow-up questions also point towards time-saving behaviour.

The median number of interviews completed on one day was 6, whereas the group of the seven suspicious interviewers shows a median of 10 completed interviewers per day. Such a constantly high number of successful interviews is an unlikely scenario, an assumption confirmed by field visits of TRANSMIT researchers.[6] In three different cities (Istanbul, Izmir, and Gaziantep), we

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[4] As we analyze statistical distributions within the interviews of each single interviewer in one sample (Syrian vs host) we exclude those interviewers who had less than five interviews in one sample. This caused the exclusion of 315 interviews from a total of 136 interviewers in the analysis.

[5] The simulation study of Kuriakose and Robbins (2016) suggests an 85 percent matching between two interviews to be a statistically highly unlikely event, particularly for long questionnaires. While they are referring to interview pairs for which an 85 percent matching is highly unlikely, our analysis targets averages within interviewer. We thus assume an average matching rate of 80 percent within all interviews of the same interviewer as a highly unlikely event and consider it a conservative indicator of fraudulent behavior.

6 Although this concerned data collections for the third wave, we assume these recruitment difficulties to apply for all waves.

observed the interviewers' difficulties in recruiting respondents. They sometimes spent hours in the field with no interview recorded and felt lucky if they went home with one or two completed interviews. These observations support the hypothesis of deviant interviewer behaviour with the goal of saving time due to the difficulty of interviewer tasks. Regarding the number of triggered follow-up questions, we found suspicious interviews for all seven suspicious interviewers. On average, 24 percent of their interviews were affected. Two additional interviews of otherwise unsuspicious interviews also showed uncommonly low numbers of triggered follow-up questions. For the reported network sizes, four interviewers with a total of 48 interviews showed suspiciously small network sizes. Their interviews were otherwise unsuspicious on all other indicators. The thresholds for which we consider an interview or an interviewer suspicious are defined in Box 1.

In sum, the duplicate analysis remains our strongest predictor of fraudulent behaviour and is supported by some, but not all other tested indicators. To clean the data from potentially manipulated data, we, therefore, (1) exclude all interviews from interviewers who have a suspiciously high matching rate. In addition, we (2) exclude the interviews of interviewers who are flagged by two or more additional indicators. We furthermore test the deviation of single interviews from the "statistical normal" independent of who ran them. If an interview is flagged by two indicators out of four (see Box 1), we exclude them from the data set.

Box 1 Fraud identification framework

Interviewer level indicators: all interviews of an interviewer deleted in case of 2 flags out of 4

1. matching rate: the median matching rate of an interviewer's interviews is 80 percent or higher. This means that his/her interviews are on average identical on at least 80 percent of interview questions (see ft. 4)

2. number of interviews per day: the average number of an interviewer's completed interviews per day is 8 or more, i.e. higher than the sample median plus one median absolute deviation (MAD).

3. straightlining: the interviews of an interviewer show straightlining in at least 6 out of 7 item batteries on average. We refer to a straightlined item battery if the answers are identical for all items (e.g. always taking value 1)

4. network size: the median reported network size (i.e., household size plus family members outside household) is one, i.e. smaller than the sample median minus one median absolute deviation (MAD).

Interview level indicators: interview deleted in case of 2 flags out of 4

1. number of interviews per day: interview was completed on a day when an interviewer completed 8 or more interviews, i.e. more than the sample median plus one MAD.

2. matching rate: matching rate with another interview is 85 percent or higher (Kuriakose/Robinson, 2016)

3. triggered filters: the share of triggered filters (relative to the number of possible filters) is more than the median share plus one MAD. This threshold differs by group given differences in the questionnaire (host panellists: 87 percent, host refreshment: 84 percent, Syrian panellists: 82 percent, Syrian refreshment: 77 percent).

4. straightlining: in the interview, the responses in 6 or more item batteries out of 7 take the same value.


Our identification framework flagged seven suspicious interviewers, resulting in the deletion of 294 interviews. Another two interviews conducted by non-suspicious interviewers were flagged as fraudulent, resulting in the deletion of 296 interviews in total. Given the small number of additional interviews identified we assume that deviant interviewer behaviour was not widespread among the interviewers employed for this survey but was rather carried out by a small group. Interestingly, mostly the Syrian sample was affected. All identified fraudulent interviewers ran interviews in the Syrian strata, while only one interview was flagged as fraudulent in the Turkish strata. This likely reflects the difficulties of recruiting Syrian participants in a random walk setup, increasing the incentives of fraudulent behaviour to save resources. Also, fraudulent interviews occur more likely in the refreshment sample. 13 percent of the interviews with newly recruited respondents are affected in contrast to 9 percent of the panel respondent interviews.

3 Demographic characteristics

The gender distribution is slightly skewed towards females for the Turkish sample (54 vs 46 percent) and towards males for the Syrian sample (46 vs 54 percent). Syrian respondents are on average slightly younger than the Turkish sample (34 vs 35 on average; see Figure 1 for the distribution of age groups). These demographic features confirm earlier findings for the Syrian population in Turkey (Aksu et al., 2022).

When expanding the focus beyond the respondents and including all members of the sampled household, Syrian households remain younger than the households of the host population. This difference is primarily driven by the presence of children. On average, a Syrian household has 1.5 minor children compared to 0.7 children in a Turkish household (also see Figure 2). Furthermore, Syrian households are larger than the average Turkish household (4.0 vs 3.1 members per household on average). Interestingly, Syrian respondents rarely report to live separated from their partners or children. Merely 1 percent of Syrians in a relationship have a partner living outside the household, which compares to partnered hosts who report this setup in 2 percent of the cases. Similarly, only 3 percent of the Syrian respondents with children report at least one child residing outside the household. Family unification thus seems completed in most of the cases.

Figure 1: Age distribution by strata, N= 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 2: Number of children by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

4 Migration biographies

When conflict erupted in Syria in 2011, the majority of Syrians sought immediate humanitarian protection in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. Starting in 2013, Turkey became increasingly important as a receiving country for Syrian refugees despite tightening immigration policies (Gundacker, Keita, and Ruhnke., 2024). Correspondingly, in the survey data, half of the Syrian respondents report to have entered Turkey between 2013 and 2015. This pattern is consistent with Turkish registry data which report that the number of Syrians in Turkey with a temporary protection status jumped from about 14.000 by the end of 2012 to 2.5 Million by the end of 2015 (Presidency of Migration Management, Ministry of the Interior, Turkey, 2024).

The vast majority of the Syrian respondents (68 percent) applied for asylum or temporary protection in Turkey. Ten percent entered via a UN resettlement program or through family reunification. Concerns about violence and armed conflict represented the main reason to migrate to Turkey, mentioned by more than half of the respondents (52 percent). This result is mirrored in their self-perception dominated by being refugee or displaced, asylum seeker, or a person in temporary protection[7] (Figure 3). In addition, respondents indicated to have migrated to flee political persecution (21 percent), to find a job (22 percent) and to join family members (15 percent, see Figure 4, note that multiple answers were possible). A very small share of the Syrian respondents (2 percent) reported their family to have had a history of work or circular migration (e.g. seasonal work migration) to Turkey before 2011. Only 30 percent actually intended to migrate to Turkey as their preferred destination, indicating that a large proportion of Syrians originally intended to seek refuge in destinations other than Turkey but nevertheless remained in the country. These observations may reflect the perpetual lack of legal channels for humanitarian migration, e.g. into the EU, as well as EU policies of external border protection including the EU-Turkey agreement. Accordingly, empirical evidence suggests strong selection along refugee migration routes being dependent on individual resource endowment (Gundacker, Keita and Ruhnke, 2024).

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[7] Possible answer options were refugee or displaced, asylum seeker, economic migrant, migrant worker, exchange student, skilled work migrant, transit migrant, environmental migrant, person in Exile, person in temporary protection, accompanying migrant, nomad, adventurer, and typical citizen of this country. Multiple answers were possible.

Figure 3: Self perception, N = 939, multiple answers possible

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 4:   Syrians: Reasons for going to Turkey, N = 944, multiple answers possible

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

5 Educational background

5.1   Syrians: lower educational attainment than their Turkish neighbours

An important aspect of socioeconomic participation is education. In terms of completed educational degrees, Syrians fall behind their Turkish counterparts. For one, this is a statistical artefact because Syrians are younger on average and are thus at earlier educational stages. Accordingly, 9 percent of the Syrians below the age of 45 indicate that they want to attain further education in the future. Secondly, the displacement following the conflict in Syria disrupted educational careers. At the same time, Syrians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, or Turkey display a higher average educational attainment than the population in Syria (Spörlein et al., 2020; Welker, 2022).

The educational profiles of Syrians furthermore strongly differ by gender. In Figure 5, we display the highest educational degree of individuals at the age of 21 and older by gender and strata. 15 percent of the Syrian women and 14 percent of the Turkish women indicate to never have attended school. Another 9 percent of the Syrian women (vs 6 percent of the Turkish women) left school without a school certificate. These groups are smaller for both Syrian and Turkish men, but still of non-negligible size. 9 percent of the Syrian men never attended school (vs 5 percent of

the Turkish men) or left school without certificate (10 vs 4 percent). A comparably large share of Syrians went to primary school only (38 percent of the women and 27 percent of the men, compared to 27 and 21 percent in the Turkish sample, respectively). 20 percent of the Syrian women and 26 percent of the Syrian men completed middle school (i.e., lower secondary education), compared to 16 and 19 percent for women and men in the Turkish sample. 12 percent of the Syrian women and 17 percent of the Syrian men finished high school (i.e., upper secondary education). This share is higher for the Turkish sample (24 and 29 percent for women and men, accordingly). On the upper end of the scale, gender differences strongly decrease for the Syrian sample: 6 percent of the women and 7 percent of the men hold a university degree (Turkish women and men: 7 and 11 percent, respectively). Vocational training does not play a significant role for either of the groups except Turkish men (6 percent). Note that Turkish respondents were much more likely to refuse an answer to the item on education, which might skew the results.

Figure 5: Highest educational degree by strata and gender, respondents aged 21 years or older, N = 2,027

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

## 5.2 Turkish language proficiency: upward trend for Syrian women over time

Skills in the host country language are discussed in the literature as post-migration human capital (Friedberg, 2000). There is empirical evidence that host country's language skills increase for instance the employability and the salary of migrants (Chiswick and Miller, 2002). A lack of

host country language skills limits the type of jobs migrants have access to, challenge the ability to navigate complex healthcare and bureaucratic systems and pose a major barrier to long-term integration. Figure 6 displays the share of Syrians with good or very good Turkish skills (reading and writing) by gender and years since migration, illustrating small to moderate increases in Turkish language proficiency over time. For the time-sensitive analyses, we aggregate one to five years since migration into one group due to sample sizes.

Overall, 52 percent of the Syrian women and 57 percent of the Syrian men self-report good to very good Turkish skills (see Table A3 in the Appendix). We see an upward trend for women, with the share with good to very good Turkish skills increasing from 43 percent of the most recent cohort (residing in the country five years or less) to 62 percent for those in the country ten or more years. For men, no such dynamic development can be observed; the Turkish skills of men largely group around the mean for most cohorts. For the cohort that has resided in Turkey for 10 or 11 years[8], the gender differences disappear. Interestingly, gender differences in host country language skills are much less pronounced than for refugees in Germany (Eckhard, 2024; Brücker et al., 2023) and, in contrast to Germany, disappear in Turkey after 10 years of stay. Overall, the improvement in host country language skills is less pronounced than it has been observed for refugees in Germany. Note, however, the different time spans that are observed. While the German data focuses on the early years after arrival (up to 6 years in Eckhard, 2024), we observe Syrians up to ten years after arrival. In addition, language and integration classes were largely compulsory for Syrians seeking refuge in Germany, whereas in Turkey such classes were optional and not systematically available (Rottmann, 2020).

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[8] Remember that Syrians with a longer period of stay were excluded from the sample, see Section 2.4.

Figure 6:   Share of good or very good Turkish skills among Syrians by gender and years since migration, in percent, N = 944

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

5.3   Limited educational participation of Syrian respondents

Evidence from previous research shows that particularly high-skilled migrants show a preference to invest in their education in host countries (Bygnes, 2021; van Heelsum, 2017). Downward social mobility harms their wealth, social status, and self-esteem more compared to those with lower (educational) status before migration (Porter and Haslam, 2005). TRANSMIT data confirms this trend for high skilled Syrians in Turkey, but overall finds low levels of educational participation among Syrians. 7 percent of all Syrian respondents have attended school in Turkey or are currently in schooling in Turkey. Men are almost twice as likely as women to take up education in Turkey (8 percent of Syrian men vs 5 percent of Syrian women are currently in schooling or have attended school). None of them belong to the group which never attended school in Syria; instead, the majority (39 percent) are high school diploma certificate holders. Syrians with educational participation are on average significantly younger than the sample average (25 years compared to 34.7). The overall low rate of educational participation may be a matter of financial hardship as well as the lack of systematic integration policies in Turkey as discussed in Section 6. For Germany, Brücker et al. (2019) record an educational participation for 10 percent of the refugees (not counting language and integration classes) and find a similar gap between women and men (5 vs 11 percent). The share in educational participation almost doubles for refugee women in Germany without minor children in the household, suggesting that

care obligations disproportionally allocated to women represent a major obstacle to female educational participation. The dominance of carework and household chores among Syrian women in Turkey is discussed in 6.3.

We furthermore observe a significant drop in school attendance among minor Syrians above the age of 15. To that end, we combine information on the respondent with information on each household member gathered through the respondent (for details on the household data, see Section 0). 86 percent of the Syrians aged six to ten attend school. For those aged 11 to 15, the share is 84 percent. For the group of 16 to 18-year-olds, the share of those attending school drops to 55 percent, confirming earlier findings (Dayioğlu et al., 2023). This sharply contrasts with the Turkish sample of this age group which has an attendance rate of 88 percent (Table 1). This likely is a matter of economic necessity: Aydin and Kaya (2019) show how families feel forced to prioritize spending for necessities or that children need to contribute to income generating activities.

Table 1: Respondents and household members aged 18 or younger: school attendance rates at time of the survey by strata and age groups, shares in percent

	Host	Syrian	Total
6-10 years	94	86	88
11-15 years	92	84	87
16-18 years	88	55	69
Total	92	79	84
Frequency	739	1,430	2,169

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

6 Employment and livelihood

6.1 Most Syrian households rely on labour income

Typically, refugees experience a range of disadvantages in receiving labour markets. Poor preparation of migration and labour market integration compared to other migrants, a lower fit of their skills to labour demand, difficulties to transfer formal qualifications, a lack of language skills, institutional and cultural knowledge, resource losses due to their forced migration, discriminating practices in job application processes, and health risks related to pre-and post-migration factors complicate their labour market participation (Ambrosetti et al., 2021; Walther et al., 2020). As a result, refugees often depend on social benefits, particularly in the early years after arrival. In Germany, for example, seven or more years after arrival, about two-thirds are employed, but still 39 percent of the refugees receive social benefits (albeit some of those supplement income with transfers, Brücker et al., 2024). As part of the EU-Turkey agreement, the EU finances social benefit programs for particular groups of refugees such as the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) targeting vulnerable refugees and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) promoting access to schooling for refugee children. Both schemes are implemented in cooperation with the Turkish government and non-state actors (Kirişci, 2021).

Other than that, the Turkish state has not adopted a systematic federal support scheme to provide social benefits to Syrian refugees (Tumen, 2023). Accordingly, only 6 percent of the Syrian respondents log in state transfers or pensions as their main source of income (see Figure 7). As one of their main sources of income, 12 percent report humanitarian aid and 5 percent transfers from family or friends. For the overwhelming majority (90 percent), however, paychecks from their jobs represent the main source of their income.[9] This pattern stands in stark contrast to a commonly held belief in the Turkish public that most Syrians rely entirely on tax-payer-financed welfare programs for their livelihood.

For the largest part, labour incomes stem from daily wage work (see Figure 7). Daily wage work indicates to be hired on demand, often on a daily basis, e.g. in construction or in agriculture (see Section 6.5.), with no future job security. An additional 26 percent indicates private or public sector employment or self-employment (17 percent) as main income source.

Figure 7:   Sources of household income by strata, N = 2,181; multiple answers per respondent possible

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

6.2   High employment-rates among Syrians but predominantly informal work

Economic participation crucially depends on the institutional setup. Starting in 2016, Syrians were officially granted access to the Turkish labour market, i.e., they could apply for official work

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[9] Note that up to three answers were possible, such that households relying on employment may additionally receive other transfers.

permits. Formal employment remains, however, at low rates. This can be attributed to the practical difficulties of formally entering employment: for each job, Syrians have to apply for a work permit through their prospective employer which has a maximum validity of one year. At the time of data collections, employers were obliged to limit their number of Syrian workers to one in ten. Also, a work permit could only be issued in the province of first registry. Moving into another province (e.g., because of family ties or other networks or to realize employment or education possibilities) led to the loss of protection status and the eligibility to work. Finally, obtaining a work permit resulted in the loss of eligibility for the ESSN social benefits for the entire family. As a result, Syrian employment in Turkey has largely been reported as substandard and informal (Demirci and Kirdar, 2023; Badalič, 2023; Ruhnke, 2021).

In our sample, we observe an employment rate of 60 percent for the Syrian sample compared to 47 percent for the Turkish sample. The recorded unemployment rate ranges at 8 percent for the Syrian respondents compared to 25 percent for the Turkish respondents (Table 2). These figures use the OECD concepts of employment rate (reflecting employed individuals as a share of the working age population) and unemployment rate (reflecting unemployed individuals as a share of the overall work force).[10] For 2017, the Turkish Household Labour Force Survey rendered an employment rate among Syrians of 40 percent (based on the OECD definition, ILO, 2020). This special module was, however, discontinued, such that the figures were not updated for our period of observation.

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[10] Following the OECD definition, we count the following persons into the workforce: individuals at working age (between 15 and 64 years) who are in employment or available for work and looking for a job. Individuals up to the age of 14, the retired (aged 65 or older), individuals with disabilities or in sickness, those in education, in parental leave or individuals exclusively dedicated at unpaid carework and housework, individuals without work permission and those not actively looking for a job are considered to be out of the workforce. As employment we consider all types of employment: part- and full-time, self-employment, and daily wage work.

Table 2:   Labour force and employment status by strata and gender, shares in percent

Employment status of working age population (15-64 years)									
	Host			Syrian			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Non-employed	22	67	46	21	61	40	22	64	43
Employed	70	27	47	78	39	60	74	32	53
n.a.	8	6	7	1	0	0	4	4	4
Frequency	541	636	1.177	501	429	930	1.042	1.065	2.107

Employment status of labour force									
	Host			Syrian			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Non-employed	13	42	25	6	11	8	10	30	17
Employed	87	58	75	94	89	92	90	70	83
Frequency	437	296	733	417	192	609	854	488	1.342

All respondents: labour force participation of working age population (15-64 years) (OECD definition)									
	Host			Syrian			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Inactive	15	50	34	17	56	35	16	52	34
Active	77	44	59	82	44	65	79	44	62
n.a.	8	6	7	1	0	0	4	4	4
Frequency	570	667	1.237	507	437	944	1.077	1.104	2.181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

6.3   Gendered patterns of Syrian labour market participation

For Syrian labour force participation in Turkey, we observe stark gender differences. Overall, 39 percent of working age Syrian women and 78 percent of working age Syrian men indicate to be in employment. This resembles the gendered patterns observed for refugee women and men in Germany: Brücker et al. (2024) report 28 percent of the women and 75 percent of the men to be in employment seven years after arrival in Germany, increasing to 33 percent for women and 85 percent for men eight years after arrival. For Syrian women and men residing for 8 years in Turkey, employment rates range at 47 and 85 percent, respectively (see Figure 10 and Table A4 in the Appendix), rendering largely comparable figures at first glance. However, the comparison is influenced by the fact that the German figures refer to employment in the formal sector only, while the Turkish data covers informal employment as well. This is an important limitation for the comparability of employment rates between countries such as Turkey, where 87 percent of employment of the refugee population is in the informal sector (see 6.5 and Table 3), and countries such as Germany, where the institutional framework strongly discourages informal employment.

Just like refugee women in Germany, Syrian women bear the largest chunk of unpaid household labour and carework. 50 percent of the Syrian women in the sample carry out unpaid household labour and carework as their main activity, compared to 8 percent of Syrian men (see Figure 8).

An additional 22 percent of the Syrian women indicates employment while at the same time being responsible for household and carework. Among those women who do not indicate household and carework responsibilities, the majority is, in fact, in employment (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Hence, traditional family roles and care obligations play a major role for the employment patterns of women.

These results are not unique to Syrian refugees in Turkey. Among the Turkish women in the sample, 42 percent indicate unpaid household labour and carework as their main activity compared to 3 percent of Turkish men (Figure 8. Among the Turkish women without these obligations the majority indicates employment (see Table A5 in the Appendix). For Germany, Brücker et al. (2020) confirm that independent of the employment status, women bear the majority of household and carework. This holds true for refugees, other migrants, as well as for Germans.

6.4 Minor changes in Syrian labour market participation over time

In Germany, the duration of stay is another strong predictor of the economic participation of refugees. In other words, employment rates steadily increase with duration of stay (Brücker et al., 2023, 2024). For Syrians in Turkey, we cannot observe a time trend: employment remains at similar levels despite increasing lengths of stay in the country (Figure 10). In other words, in line with previous findings (Demirci and Kirdar, 2023) the probability of being employed does not notably increase with years since migration, at least for the years we can observe. [11]

While Germany has a long tradition of immigration, and labour immigration in particular, Turkey is largely inexperienced in receiving constant immigration inflows. In Germany, institutions have been in place for decades to administer legal issues as well as social and integration policies. The German government has put an emphasis on the economic participation of refugees and put active labour market policies in place: refugees are, in general, obliged to take language classes and are actively supported by the employment agencies to take job trainings and enter formal employment. Despite large sums of EU money being transferred to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey agreement, no such systematic labour market policies are in place for Syrian refugees in Turkey (Demirci and Kirdar, 2023). Efforts to bring Syrian refugees into employment have largely remained local and small in volume, carried out by local actors and NGOs without coordination on the national level (Tumen, 2023). This contributes to the undynamic nature of Syrian employment over time, in contrast to the time trend that can be observed for refugees in Germany.

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[11] Note that we cannot break down employment by years since migration for individuals who have been in the country for less than five years given small sample sizes.

Figure 8:   Activity status by strata and gender, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 9:   Employment rate of Syrians by gender and years since migration, shares in percent, N = 944

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

6.5 Mostly manual jobs and informal employment schemes

The obstacles to formal employment, the temporary nature of the legal status for Syrians in Turkey, and the absence of systematic labour market support policies for refugees in Turkey (see above) affect their economic participation. The absence of social benefits (other than ESSN for the most vulnerable groups) furthermore increases the economic pressure on refugees to earn a living. In sum, these conditions have consequences for the quality of employment.

68 percent of employed Syrian men and 72 percent of employed Syrian women pursue daily wage work (Table 3). This type of employment reflects a precarious labour market status as it implies hiring on demand, often on a day-to-day basis. It typically involves low-skilled manual tasks, e.g. in construction, trash collection, or the agricultural sector, and exposes workers to potential maltreatment and wage theft. It furthermore does not offer long-term job security (Baban et al., 2017). Working in daily wage schemes does not seem to be a matter of qualifications: both high-school certificate holders and individuals with little or no schooling are overrepresented in the group of wage workers compared to Syrians working outside daily wage working schemes. Daily wage work seldomly occurs among the Turkish survey respondents in employment (men: 6 percent, women: 5 percent), who are overall much more likely to work in the private sector (61 percent), in the public sector (13 percent) or in self-employment (21 percent, Table 3).

The jobs Syrians carry out are mostly of physical nature: 75 percent of the employed Syrian men and 64 percent of the employed Syrian women indicate predominantly manual labour. This strongly contrasts with 37 percent of the Turkish men and 53 percent of the Turkish women in employment indicating predominantly non-manual labour or only little manual labour (Table 3).

At the same time, Syrians are disproportionally more likely to be in informal employment : 87 percent of all working Syrians indicate an informal work scheme, compared to 21 percent among the Turkish hosts (Table 3).   These outcomes confirm the findings of earlier studies on high levels of informal Syrian labor market participation in Turkey (see Tumen, 2023, for an overview). Ceritoglu et al. (2017) furthermore report employment losses among informal workers and employment gains among formal workers.

Table 3: Sector, type and formality of labour by strata and gender among employed individuals by strata and gender, shares in percent

|	Host			Syrian			Total		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Sector of employment									
Employed in private sector	60	61	61	25	22	24	42	42	42
Employed in public sector	12	16	13	1	1	1	6	9	7
Self-employed	22	17	21	6	5	6	14	11	13
Daily wage worker	6	5	5	68	72	69	37	38	38
Type of employment									
Predominantly manual labour	63	47	58	75	64	72	69	56	65
Only little manual labour	24	37	28	19	32	23	22	35	26
Predominantly non-manual labour	13	16	14	6	4	5	9	10	9
Formality of employment									
refuse/don't know	4	5	4	1	1	1	2	3	3
Informal employment	18	27	21	88	86	87	53	56	54
Formal employment	78	68	75	12	13	12	44	41	43

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

6.6 Wages below the minimum wage and prevalent poverty among Syrians

32 percent of the Syrian respondents in the TRANSMIT data report their household to not be able to afford food- Another 37 percent cannot cover other basic needs with their income. Among the Turkish respondents, these shares range at 26 and 19 percent, respectively. At similar levels, respondents of the Syrian and the Turkish sample indicate to not have enough for unexpected expenses (15 and 17 percent, respectively, Figure 10).

The household economic situation varies by household size (Figure 11). For larger Syrian households we find a higher risk of a precarious economic household situation: for households with six members or more, the share unable to afford or other basics increases to 41 and 36 percent, respectively. This disproportionally affects households with children. 73 percent of all Syrian households with minor children cannot afford food or other basics (compared to a share of 62 percent of households without minor children). The findings indicate that despite a high labor market activity among Syrians in Turkey, returns on their work seldomly deliver resources that guarantee a life in absence of precarity and poverty.

Figure 10: Economic household situation by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 11: Economic household situation by household size and strata, N = 2181


Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Incomes in the period under study have to be interpreted in light of the continued devaluation of the Turkish currency and the rising consumer price index (CPI). Overall, the fieldwork phase falls into a period of severe economic downturn in Turkey starting in 2018, marked by high inflation. The CPI increased by 12.3, 19.6, and 72.3 percentage points in 2020, 2021, and 2022 compared to

the previous year, respectively (OECD, 2024a). [12] During the fieldwork period (5.12.2021-25.1.2022), prices for goods and services notably increased: in December 2021 and January 2022, prices increased by 13.6 and 11.1 percentage points, respectively, compared to the previous month (OECD, 2024b), thus lowering real incomes of households. The majority of both Syrians and Turkish respondents (48 and 52 percent, respectively) indicate a monthly household income of 2000 to 4000 Turkish Lira (TL, Figure 12), an equivalent of 130 to 260 Euro at the time of the survey.[13] Remarkably, a third of the Syrian respondents indicates a household income below 2000 TL (including no income), in contrast to 6 percent of the Turkish respondents. Turkish respondents are in turn more likely to indicate a household income above 4000 TL (27 percent of the Turkish respondents vs 12 percent of Syrians) or to refuse an answer (20 vs 3 percent). The large discrepancy in the refusal rates may reflect different social contexts: while Syrian respondents may have an interest to highlight their precarious situations in international surveys (and thus do not refuse the income question), Turkish respondents with below-average income may have a higher likelihood to refuse an answer. In fact, more than half of the Turkish respondents who refused to give information on the household income indicated no personal income (not displayed in figures).

Figure 12: Household income by strata, N = 2181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

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[12] See Ulug et al. (2023) for further readings on the situation of the Turkish economy between 2018 and 2022.

[13] At the time of the survey (with a relatively short fieldwork period, 5.12.2021-25.1.2022), the Turkish Lira (TL) on average valued 15.4TL/Euro, starting at 15.6TL/Euro at the beginning of the fieldwork (5.12.2021) and 15.3TL/Euro at the end of the fieldwork (25.1.2022) (ECB, 2024).

Figure 13: Household income by strata and household size, N = 2181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

An alternative explanation is that those household members without own income may also have less knowledge on the household's financial situation as a whole.

Just as the subjective evaluation of the household's economic situation, the household incomes vary with the size of the household (see Figure 13). Syrians on average live in larger households which inflates their household incomes. While, for example, the majority (55 percent) of Syrian one-person households has an income of 2000 TL or less, this is only the case for 8 percent of the Turkish one-person households. On the other end of the spectrum, a similar picture emerges. Confirming results of the subjective evaluation of the household's economic situation displayed above, large Syrian households (with 6 members or more) have a considerable likelihood of precarization, with 46 percent indicating a monthly income of 0 to 2000 TL and another 45 percent of up to 4000 TL. This leaves the households with a maximum of 333 TL and 667 TL of income per household member, respectively, which equals to 21.5 and 43 Euro at the time of the survey. For large Turkish households (with six or more members), 2 percent indicate an income of up to 2000 TL and 41 percent of up to 4000 TL.

In addition to the household wage, the composition of personal hourly wages informs about the economic livelihoods of Syrians in Turkey. The Turkish minimum hourly wage (net) rose from 12.55 TL in 2021 to 18.90 TL in January 2022. We thus analyse hourly wages separately for respondents interviewed in 2021 and 2022. We rely on exact income responses by respondents rather than intervalled answers. The increased minimum wage does not materialize for either of the groups; wages for Syrians even slightly drop in 2022 (from 12.5 to 11.1 TL per hour; see Table 4). Over the entire period, Syrian median hourly wages remain below the minimum wage in

Turkey, confirming earlier findings on the severe underpayment of Syrians (Baban et al., 2017). Interestingly, wages remain on similarly low levels for both daily wage workers and other types of employment. Only Syrians indicating self-employment report slightly higher wages, but the number of observations for these groups is low (N=25). With the rise of the minimum wage in 2022 and a median hourly wage of 15.0 TL in 2022, the Turkish sample on average also fell below the Turkish minimum wage in 2022. In 2021, with a median hourly wage of 14.4 TL they still ranged above the minimum wage. Recall once more, however, that the Turkish sample is not necessarily representative for Turkey as a whole (see 2.2).

Table 4:   Median wages of employed respondents by strata and survey year, hourly wages in TL

Survey year	Turkish	Syrian
2021	14.4	12.5
2022	15.0	11.1

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

7 Well-being and social cohesion

7.1 High levels of life satisfaction and health

Complementing the socio-economic situations of the Syrian population, TRANSMIT data offers insights into their subjective life satisfaction and health. Literature on social determinants of the health of migrants (Castañeda et al., 2015; Miller and Rasmussen, 2017) would expect relatively low levels of well-being among Syrian respondents due to their largely precarious socio-economic situations.

In terms of life satisfaction, differences between the Syrian and the Turkish sample are in fact moderate. Slightly more than a third of both Syrian and Turkish respondents (34 and 36 percent, respectively) indicate to be very satisfied or moderately satisfied in general with their life. Slightly more Turkish than Syrian respondents indicate to be moderately dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (17 vs 14 percent, respectively), while Syrians cluster more around the neutral categories (Figure 14). These results at first appear to contrast their outlined precarious socio-economic situation. Yet, the reference groups respondents refer to for such subjective assessments may differ: while the host population compares their well-being to their local or national peers, Syrian refugees may be comparing their lives with those still in Syria or others hit by personal, emotional and economic losses. They may also be comparing their current living situation to their living situation before settling in Turkey. In other words, the relatively high levels of life satisfaction of Syrians may reflect their relief to be able to live under more safe conditions than in war-struck Syria. The Syrian answers could also reflect social desirability prompting a grateful evaluation of the living conditions and a reluctance or prudence to criticize the host society and its politics. Similar tendencies had been observed in qualitative research with Syrian refugees in Jordan, Croatia, Sweden and Germany (Abdel-Fatah et al., 2021). Finally, these patterns may be driven by the different samples we compare. The survey oversampled host respondents living in areas with

a high share of Syrians, presumably skewed towards the lower socioeconomic spectrum, rendering skewed well-being indicators (see 2.2).

This picture repeats for the relative well-being Syrian respondents indicate. In the survey, respondents are asked to evaluate their household's current living situation "compared to most others in Turkey". Almost one in three of the Syrians (31 percent) compared to only one in five (20 percent) of the Turks feel they are moderately better or much better off than others in Turkey. Turkish respondents are instead more likely to feel moderately worse or much worse off (11 vs 5 percent for the Syrians, Figure 15).

Figure 14: Life satisfaction by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 15: Relative well-being "in comparison to most others in Turkey" by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Figure 16: Self-rated health by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

A similar pattern arises for self-rated health. The majority of the Syrians report their general health status to be very good or moderately good. Only 10 percent of the Syrian respondents evaluate their health status to be moderately poor or very poor (Turkish sample: 11 percent). At

the same time, Syrians report difficulties to access healthcare. Half of them (49 percent) evaluate it to be somewhat difficult or very difficult to see a doctor, compared to 36 percent of the Turkish respondents. While temporary protection status grants Syrians free access to healthcare services (within their province of registration), these reported difficulties may reflect the overall understaffed Turkish healthcare systems and the additional challenges Syrians face, such as language barriers, little familiarity with the healthcare system and a lack of institutional trust (Alawa et al., 2019; Genç and Elitsoy, 2023). Non-registered Syrians or Syrians seeking healthcare elsewhere than in their province of registration are only allowed to receive emergency healthcare services (Alawa et al., 2019). If in need, they are compelled to approach private clinics for healthcare services, despite the costs (Genç and Elitsoy, 2023).

In addition to their overall health, respondents were asked to report on their mental distress (see Figure 17). Based on the well-established short version of the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-2; Levis et al., 2021; Löwe et al., 2005), a standardized instrument in health research, we observe lower levels of distress among the Syrian than the Turkish respondents. 20 percent of the Syrian respondents report to feel down, depressed, or hopeless more than half of the days or nearly every day, compared to 27 percent among the Turkish respondents. 16 percent of the Syrian sample have little interest and pleasure in doing things more than half of the days or nearly every day (Turkish sample: 22 percent, Figure 17). For both PHQ measures, the outcomes are significantly different for Syrian and Turkish respondents based on Chi-square tests of independence. These results contrast with the literature on mental health which usually reports poorer mental health for refugees compared to host or non-refugee populations (Hoell et al., 2021; Silove et al., 2017). Yet again, the host sample is not representative for the Turkish society as the survey oversampled host respondents with presumably lower socioeconomic status (see 2), rendering elevated mental distress more likely. In addition, data collection for this report predated the upsurge of anti-migrant sentiments observed in Turkey in the last years (Erdoğan, 2022), which is expected to further impair the mental health conditions of the Syrians (Ruhnke et al., 2024).

7.2   Decentralized housing and safe neighborhoods

The quality of housing, including the socio-spatial location, is an important aspect for a person to feel well and at home (Ager and Strang, 2008). According to UNHCR (2022), only 2 percent of all refugees in Turkey were living in temporary accommodation centers run by the Presidency of Migration Management in 2021. Beyond the accommodation in these centers, the Turkish government does not provide housing or rent payments to persons under temporary protection (Rottman, 2020). The TRANSMIT data did not sample Syrians in state accommodation centers. Syrian respondents mainly live in houses, apartments, or private rooms (71 percent), and around a third (28 percent) shares a room with a non-household member in a private house or apartment. They usually do not own the object they are living in, in contrast to 41 percent of the Turkish respondents.

Figure 17: Self-rated mental distress by strata, N = 2,181

Little interest or pleasure in doing things

	refuse	Not at all	Several days	More than half of the days	Nearly everyday
Host		47	27	17	5
Syrian		56	27	10	6

Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless

	refuse	Not at all	Several days	More than half of the days	Nearly everyday
Host		46	25	21	6
Syrian		43	35	11	9

% of respondents

Legend: refuse / Not at all / Several days / More than half of the days / Nearly everyday

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

Syrian respondents are more likely to feel safe in their neighbourhood compared to their Turkish counterparts (43 percent of the Syrians vs 54 of the Turks indicate to not feel safe, Figure 18). Syrians are furthermore not as worried as the host respondents about pollution and environmental degradation in their neighbourhoods. Accordingly, they are more likely than their Turkish counterparts to perceive their neighbourhoods as well taken care of (Figure 18). Again, this is likely to reflect different reference points. Having fled war and violence, Syrians feel relatively safe in their new residences. At the same time, back in Syria, their neighbourhoods may, on average, have been better off than the quarters in which they found refuge in Turkey. Using their homes in Syria as a reference point skews the evaluation of their Turkish neighbourhoods downwards.

Figure 18: Neighbourhood satisfaction by strata, N = 2,181

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

7.3 Discriminatory experiences and low levels of connectedness with Turkey

A final important aspect of well-being are social networks and social cohesion[14]. At an initial stage, the Turkish public was welcoming towards the Syrian "guests". As displacement continued and economic conditions in Turkey worsened, acceptance and solidarity continuingly decreased (Yıldız and Uzgören, 2016; Rottmann, 2020). In 2021, 80 percent of the Turkish population wanted the Syrians to be deported to their home country (Erdoğan, 2022).

This contrasts with the records on discrimination as reported in the TRANSMIT data. Most Syrian respondents (80 percent) state that they never or almost never experienced being disadvantaged due to their nationality in the past two years. However, these insights align with a qualitative study in which Parker (2018) explored asylum seekers' tendencies to downplay discrimination and racism to keep a positive attitude of the host society and to not be perceived as complaining.

Also, when asking more precisely about verbal or physical attacks as a result of discrimination, a different picture emerges. More than a third of the Syrian respondents (38 percent) have been verbally attacked as a result of discrimination on a regular basis (i.e., sometimes, fairly often, or very often). 15 percent report physical attacks. Respondents were, however, not asked to specify on which grounds the discriminatory behaviour or attack occurred. Regarding sexualized assaults, Syrians seem to be more at risk. 14 percent (vs 10 percent among the Turkish sample)

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[14] In the German and European context, questions of harmonious co-existence between arriving and hosting communities are largely negotiated under the term "integration". In Turkey, the common concept to describe and study those issues is social cohesion, though lacking a clear definition of the term (Erdoğan, 2022; IOM, 2019).

report to sometimes, fairly often, or very often experience sexualized assault. Gender differences in both groups are negligible. Note, though, that the quantitative recording of sexualized violence has its limits, in particular in a personal interview, and renders underestimates given the stigma attached to it.

Finally, the survey measures how connected respondents feel with Turkey. More than half of the Syrian respondents do not feel any or only a weak connection to Turkey (52 percent, Figure 19). The vast majority (84 percent) instead feels moderately connected or very connected to Syria. This difference might be driven by the identity-fomenting effects of living in exile. It furthermore reflects the temporary status that the Turkish state has assigned to Syrian refugees.

Figure 19: Syrians: feeling connected to Turkey and Syria (N=944)

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

7.4 Covid-19 Pandemic

At the time of data collection, the Covid-19 pandemic was still unfolding. Just as most other countries, Turkey had established regulations to contain the pandemic (e.g., curfews for groups at risk, regulation of indoor activities, strong restrictions on tourism and mobility) but released them gradually throughout 2021 because of increasing vaccination rates (World Bank, 2022). The strong intensive care infrastructure mitigated fatality rates, particularly at the beginning of the pandemic (OECD, 2021). Covid-19 related restrictions heavily affected the Turkish economy in 2020, but with recovering world markets and export rates, the Turkish GDP grew by 11.4 percentage points in 2021 and 5.5 percentage points in 2022 (OECD, 2024c). Nevertheless, labour demand decreased and inflation rates rose. The contracting labour market particularly hit the

informal sector with a disproportionally high share of jobs that are contact-intensive or require physical presence. Informal work schemes furthermore do not provide social security measures (OECD, 2021).

Research suggests that more vulnerable communities living in socio-economic precarity already prior to the pandemic were affected disproportionally by the various consequences of Covid-19 (Robinson et al., 2021), putting the Syrian population at particular risk. TRANSMIT data confirms that Syrians were severely affected in material terms as well as concerning housing and the loss of lives at the time of the survey [15]. 42 percent of the Syrians (compared to 7 percent of the Turks) lost their job or source of income (see Figure 20). This aligns with the precarious work and income schemes of Syrians reported in Section 6. As a consequence, we observe severe food poverty: one in three Syrian respondents and one in five Turkish respondents reported not to be able to afford food due to the pandemic. Considerably more Syrians than Turkish respondents furthermore reported to have either lost the home they rented or owned (22 percent vs 8 percent) or to have lost family, friends, or acquaintances (19 percent vs 10 percent) as a consequence of the pandemic.

Figure 20: Impact of Covid on material well-being, N = 2,181, multiple answers possible

Note: "Lost my home" includes the loss of property rented and owned by respondent or his/her family.
Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

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[15] The respective item in the questionnaire asked: „When you think about your material wellbeing, how has your household been affected by the situation surrounding Covid-19 (e.g. by lockdowns, changes in the economy)?" and allowed multiple pre-defined answers.

8 Migration Aspirations

The potential onward migration of Syrians and other refugees from Turkey into the European Union has been a prominent political issue in national and international debates, particularly among potential receiving countries such as Germany. One of the outcomes of this discourse were a number of measures, including the EU-Turkey agreement, aimed at restricting irregular migration from Turkey. As a result, Turkey is host to a large population of Syrians who would like to leave Turkey for a third country but find themselves unable to realize this desire. [16] TRANSMIT data confirms high migration aspirations towards the European Union and Germany in particular but finds only a small number of respondents actually taking steps towards leaving Turkey.

A quarter of the Syrians residing in Turkey has a strong desire to leave Turkey (indicating "I really want to move to another country", Figure 21). A similar share (23 percent) does not want to move at all. The top desired destination among those with migration aspirations is Germany (54 percent), followed by Canada (9 percent). In line with the migration network literature, individuals with family members or other social contacts abroad are more likely to express migration intentions (see Appendix Table A6). Given that the respondents were informed about German institutions as the main organizers of the survey, it can be assumed that this produced skewed answers on the desired destination towards Germany: firstly, for social desirability (to please the persons or institutions carrying out the survey). Secondly, interviewers in the field repeatedly experienced that Syrians asked for support to leave Turkey. Hoping to increase their chances to receive support they may have logged in Germany as their preferred destination. We thus assume these figures to be somewhat inflated.

Only a small share has, however, taken preparations to realize their plans: 12 percent of all Syrians with migration aspirations have made concrete plans to leave the country within the following 12 months. For those with concrete plans, the top three reasons to leave Turkey are better economic conditions, better access to education as well as human rights protection. Syrians with migration intentions but no concrete plans to realize them mostly stay in Turkey because they want to stay with their families, because they have children currently in education, and/or because they lack the financial resources. Syrians without migration intentions indicate to stay in Turkey because they are satisfied with their lives in Turkey, because they consider the country as their home and/or because they want to stay with their families. In contrast to common expectations in the respective literature, those with social networks abroad are not more likely to have concrete migration plans compared to those without networks abroad (see Appendix Table A7), underlining the hypothetical character of the migration aspiration answers.

The TRANSMIT survey samples Syrians only in Turkey. Those with strong migration intentions are more likely to already have left the country and are thus not covered in the survey. The figures can, therefore, be interpreted as reflecting the migration aspirations of Syrians residing in Turkey at the time of the survey (December 2021/January 2022). The migration aspirations furthermore do not vary significantly by arrival cohort, i.e. they do not decrease or increase with a longer residence in the country (not dispkayed). This finding suggests that, even after a decade in the

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[16] See Carling and Schewel, 2018, for the aspiration-ability model which offers a valuable approach to the distinction between wishing to migrate and being able to migrate.

country, many Syrians find themselves unable to establish a perspective for long-term settlement in Turkey, reflecting the Turkish policy framework aimed at promoting temporary rather than permanent settlement.

Figure 21: Migration aspirations from 0 ("I do not want to move at all") to 10 ("I really want to move to another country") by strata, shares in percent, N = 2,153

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own illustration.

9 Concluding Remarks

When the civil war hit Syria in 2011, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt were the first countries to receive significant numbers of Syrians seeking protection. Starting in 2013, Turkey increasingly became an important destination for Syrians as well, now hosting the largest population of displaced Syrians in absolute terms, according to UNHCR figures. Turkey thereby represents both a destination country and a transit country for individuals with onward migration plans. To limit humanitarian migration into Europe, the EU signed a migration agreement with Turkey in 2016. This agreement incentivizes Turkish efforts to prevent irregular migration to Europe with monetary support aimed at improved living conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Based on novel survey data, this report assessed the living conditions, well-being, and participation patterns of Syrian refugees in Turkey six years after the deal was signed. We employed the 2022 wave of the longitudinal survey of Syrians in Turkey and their Turkish hosts which was collected

as part of the TRANSMIT project. The analyses reveal precarious living conditions and participation patterns of Syrians in Turkey despite their increasing duration of stay.

For refugees in Germany, numbers show rising trends in employment, language proficiency, and educational participation with their length of stay. This finding cannot be confirmed for Syrian refugees in Turkey. Instead, their Turkish skills remain moderate, and educational participation remains low. The employment rate of Syrians in Turkey compares to the employment rate of refugees in Germany, but their economic participation is characterized by precarity: the majority of working Syrians earn their money in daily wage work, mostly in informal work schemes. Their pay usually remains below the minimum wage, leaving roughly a third of the surveyed households in food poverty despite the high employment rates. Households with children are disproportionally affected. This economic pressure might contribute to the school dropouts of Syrian 16-year-olds to add to the household income.

We attribute the relatively high labour market participation and the low participation in education to the fact that no systematic access to social security and education programs for Syrian refugees has been established in Turkey, apart from EU-funded programs. The fact that an official work contract leads to the loss of access to EU support schemes for the entire family furthermore contributes to the high share of informal work arrangements. The lack of systematic language courses or job trainings for Syrians in Turkey explains that job quality and wages remain at low levels throughout all arrival cohorts.

Contrasting the lack of systematic, long-term integration measures and social cohesion policies, Turkey pioneered in granting Syrians under temporary protection free access to healthcare services (within their province of registration), contributing to comparatively good health outcomes among Syrian survey respondents. Still, some difficulties in accessing healthcare remain, particularly for those not registered in their province of residence. Overall, despite the precarious living conditions and obstacles to social participation, the reported levels of well-being, health, and life satisfaction are constantly higher than for the surveyed host population. Yet, when assessing these subjective measures, two drawbacks need to be considered: 1) Syrians may compare their well-being to their situation back in Syria before coming to Turkey or to the well-being of others still in Syria and find themselves better off and 2) given the sampling design focusing on neighborhoods with strong Syria presence, the host population is presumably skewed towards the lower socioeconomic spectrum, thus representing a skewed comparison group for well-being assessments.

The substandard living conditions of Syrians in Turkey illuminated in this report could imply high migration aspirations among them. Indeed, a quarter of the Syrians surveyed in 2022 indicates a desire to leave Turkey. Germany is among the top desired destinations. Our results suggest, however, that these aspirations are largely of hypothetical nature: Only 7 percent of those with migration intentions reported to have concrete plans to actually to do so within the next year. The migration potential of Syrians from Turkey towards Germany thus seems moderate. This is not, however, a result of a successful EU-Turkey agreement. The official rationale of this deal was to keep Syrian refugees from migrating onwards because of improved living conditions in Turkey, flanked by extended border control measures. Living conditions for Syrians in Turkey remained, however, precarious despite monetary support from the EU. This was in large part due to the lack of access to the formal labour market and resulting substandard livelihoods. The stayers indicate

existing family ties as well as financial constraints which keep them from realizing their migration aspirations. At the same time, hostility against Syrians strongly increased in the period under study, straining social cohesion in Turkey. The results thus put into question whether migration agreements such as the ones recently enacted in Lebanon, Morocco, and Egypt are a viable method to achieve sustainable migration management. If pursuit, any future migration agreement should put a stronger focus on the effects on migrants as well as the host population in the respective country, possibly accompanied by large-scale evaluation schemes to assess the agreement's achievements regarding both migration management and long-term wellbeing of the affected populations.

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Appendix

Table A1: Lost panelists: reasons for attrition, shares in percent

	Host	Syrian	Total
Refused to participate	70	67	68
Moved away	26	28	27
Could not make time for the interview	2	2	2
The door did not open	2	3	3
Total	100	100	100
Frequency	1.074	1.142	2.216

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A2: Found panelists: number of visit attempts

	Host	Syrian	Total
1	54	53	54
2	30	33	31
3	16	14	15

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A3: Syrians: Turkish language skills by gender and years since migration, shares in percent, N = 944

Years since migration		Turkish language skills				
		refuse	very good/ moderately good	satisfactory	moderately poor/very poor	Frequency (N)
no data	Men	2	78	10	10	90
	Women	5	82	4	10	84
	Total	3	80	7	10	174
5 years or less	Men	0	52	14	35	66
	Women	0	43	25	33	61
	Total	0	47	19	34	127
6	Men	0	51	23	26	47
	Women	0	40	22	38	50
	Total	0	45	23	32	97
7	Men	1	45	26	27	91
	Women	0	37	13	50	62
	Total	1	42	21	37	153
8	Men	0	60	16	24	92
	Women	0	47	21	32	103
	Total	0	53	19	28	195
9	Men	1	47	22	30	79
	Women	0	50	23	28	40
	Total	1	48	22	29	119
10 or more	Men	0	64	29	7	42
	Women	0	62	22	16	37
	Total	0	63	25	11	79

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A4: Syrians: employment status by gender and years since migration, working age population (15-64), shares in percent

		Mean	Std. dev.	Freq.
Men	no data	68	47	90
	5 years or less	73	45	66
	6	85	36	47
	7	70	46	89
	8	85	36	91
	9	86	35	77
	10 or more	90	30	41
	Total	78	41	501
Women	no data	21	41	84
	5 years or less	39	49	61
	6	48	50	50
	7	33	48	60
	8	47	50	100
	9	37	49	38
	10 or more	53	51	36
	Total	39	49	429

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A5: Main activity status by household labour/carework activities, strata and gender, cell shares in percent, N = 2213

| | carries out unpaid household labour/carework | | | | | |
| | Host men | | | Host women | | |
main activity	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
not available	10		10	13		13
in schooling	6	2	8	6	2	8
searching for a job	5	1	5	6	1	7
employed	50	16	66	17	9	26
retired/disabled	3	4	7	1	1	3
inactivity	0		0	1		1
unpaid housework/carework		3	3		42	42
Total	74	26	100	45	55	100

| | carries out unpaid household labour/carework | | | | | |
| | Syrian men | | | Syrian women | | |
main activity	No	Yes	Total	No	Yes	Total
not available	0		0	0		0
in schooling	3	2	5	1	1	3
searching for a job	3	2	4	2	3	5
employed	52	25	77	16	22	39
retired/disabled	3	2	5	2	2	3
inactivity	0		0	0		0
unpaid housework/carework		8	8		50	50
Total	61	39	100	22	78	100

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A6: Syrians: Migration aspirations by availability of social network abroad

Migration aspiration	Social network abroad			
	No		Yes	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
I do not want to move to another country (for more than 3 months)	37	(194)	6	(24)
1	7	(36)	0	(2)
2	3	(17)	1	(6)
3	5	(27)	4	(18)
4	7	(34)	10	(43)
5	9	(48)	14	(58)
6	4	(19)	11	(44)
7	3	(16)	10	(39)
8	3	(14)	5	(20)
9	2	(11)	5	(22)
I really want to move to another country (for more than 3 months)	20	(106)	33	(134)
Total	100	(522)	100	(410)

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Table A7: Syrians with migration aspirations: concrete migration plans by availability of social network abroad, N = 385

Concrete migration plans	Social network abroad			
	No		Yes	
	%	(N)	%	(N)
No	82	(256)	92	(356)
Yes	18	(57)	8	(29)
Total	100	(313)	100	(385)

Source: TRANSMIT Turkey survey, wave 2 (2021/22), own calculations.

Figures

Tables

Imprint

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