

# The Contribution of Trade to Wage Inequality: The Role of Skill, Gender, and Nationality

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*Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data (CAED)*

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# The Export Wage Premium

- Manufacturing exporters differ from non-exporters:
  - Larger, more productive, pay higher wages, better technology.
- Bernard and Jensen (1995) found an export wage premium of 7% - 11% for manufacturing plants in the United States (plant-level data).
  - Confirmed for Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.
  - Export wage premium of 6% for US manufacturing for 2002.

## Source of Wage Inequality?

- Wage differentials between exporters and other firms could contribute to rising inequality in industrial countries (Krugman, 1995, 2008).
- Recent theoretical contributions propose a Melitz(2003)-framework with labor market frictions (e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009; Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer, 2011; Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding, 2010a,b).
  - Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding emphasize heterogeneity across both workers and firms.
  - Unequal effect of trade on workers with different abilities.
  - Workers of intermediate (high) abilities lose (win).

## Source of Wage Inequality?

- Bernard and Jensen (1997) argue that manufacturing exporters use highly skilled, non-production-line workers relatively more intensively than lower skilled production-line workers → Difference in demand for skilled labor between exporting and non-exporting plants, rather than differences in the exporter wage premia across skill levels.
- Distributional effects magnified or diminished, if the export wage premium differs across categories of workers in firms that export.
  - Wage inequality à la Bernard-Jensen bolstered by an export wage premium for high-skilled workers in exporting firms combined with a wage discount for their lower co-workers. Mitigated by the converse.

## Skill Level Not Considered Previously

- Plant-level studies could not study skill structure of the export trade premium:
  - Export wage premia for non-production-line vs. production-line workers (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999, 2004; Hansson and Lundin, 2004).
- Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) offer first evidence based on linked employer-employee data:
  - Separate regressions for blue-collar and white-collar workers.
  - Evidence for small premia for both groups.
  - German LIAB for the years 1995-1997.
- Munch and Skaksen (2008) find some evidence that skill intensity matters for the export wage premium:
  - Danish matched worker-firm data for the years 1995-2002.
  - Separate regressions for three educational groups.

## Main Findings and Contributions

- Differences in trade wage premium (or discount) across skill levels → evidence for *within*-group and *between*-group wage inequality.
- Up to 30 percent of the overall skill premia associated with exporting.
- These differences would tend to exacerbate effects of trade on inequality as trade expands.
- But while the export activity contributes to conditional *wage inequality* along the dimension of skill, it reduces gender-based and nationality-based conditional wage inequality (*wage discrimination*).

## Linked Employer-Employee Data (LIAB)

- IAB establishment panel from German Labor Agency:
  - Representative, stratified sample of West German establishments included in the employment statistics register from 1993 to 2007.
  - Stratum defined over 16 industries, 10 categories of establishment size and 16 German regions (Laender).
  - Participation of firms voluntary, but response rate quite high.
  - Establishments that refuse to answer are replaced by random draws from the same stratum.
  - Control variables at plant-level in following regressions: size (log total employment), work council, single plant company, in a holding company, technology.
  - Variable of main interest: export share.

# Linked Employer-Employee Data (LIAB)

- LIAB employee data (Cross-sectional model) (cont.):
  - Control variables at the individual-level: gender, nationality, tenure, experience and occupation.
  - Education: 6 groups
  - Occupation: 340 occupations, but two groupings:
    - *Arbeiter*: Lower-skilled – unskilled, blue-collar workers who might have some vocational training.
    - *Angestellte*: Higher-skilled – includes master craftsmen, white-collar workers.
  - High correspondence between a worker's occupation and whether classified as *Arbeiter* or *Angestellter*.
    - More than 90 percent of the workers in more than 200 of the 340 occupations are classified as either *Arbeiter* or *Angestellter*.
    - Fewer than 20 occupations have no more than two-thirds of one type.
  - Variable of main interest: Four categories of workplace skill level.



**Table 1: Skill Levels by Education / Occupation**

Education	Occupation Classification ( <i>Prop. Of Sample</i> )	
	<i>Arbeiter</i>	<i>Angestellter</i>
≤ 10 years, no vocational training	Low-skilled (0.34)	<i>No observations</i>
≤ 10 years, vocational training High School degree, no voc. training High School degree, vocational training	Medium-skilled (0.35)	High-skilled (0.24)
College Degree University Degree	<i>No observations</i>	Univ. Educated (0.07)

Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research.

## Export Wage Premium by Skill Level (eq. 2)

$$\ln W_{i,j,t} = \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z S_{i \in Z,t} + \Psi I_{i,t} + \Omega P_{j,t} + \tau_t + F_{i,j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- $W_{i,j,t}$  = log wage of worker  $i$  employed at plant  $j$  in year  $t$ .
- $X_{j,t}$  = share of exports at plant  $j$  in year  $t$ .
- $S_{i \in Z,t} = 1$  if worker  $i$  has skill level  $Z$ , else 0.
  - $Z = 1$  for low-skilled (omitted category), 2 for medium-skilled, 3 for high-skilled, and 4 for college or university degree.
- $\beta_L, \beta_M, \beta_H$ , and  $\beta_U$  are four skill-specific export wage premia.
- $\alpha_M, \alpha_H$  and  $\alpha_U$  are three skill coefficients not associated with exporting.
- $I_{i,t}$  = characteristics of worker  $i$  in year  $t$  other than skill.
- $P_{j,t}$  = characteristics of the plant  $j$ , where  $i$  works.
- Year fixed effects in all specifications.

## Export Wage Premium by Skill Level (eq. 2)

$$\ln W_{i,j,t} = \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z S_{i \in Z,t} + \Psi I_{i,t} + \Omega P_{j,t} + \tau_t + F_{i,j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- Other fixed effects: plant, plant-occupation and plant-individual (main specification) or “spell”-fixed effect.
- Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) show that a failure to control for individual and firm heterogeneity can lead to a substantial bias.
- Andrews, Schank and Upward (2006) propose estimation method.
- Caveat of estimates à la Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis:
  - Covariates are assumed to be strictly exogenous (e.g., Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999), i.e., any sort of self-selection not allowed.
  - Frias, Kaplan and Verhoogen (2009) relax this assumption.

**Table 2: Effect of Export Share on Wages, By Skill Level (cont.)**

<b>Panel C: <math>P \times I</math>, Plant-Individual FE</b>					
$R^2 = 0.93$ $n = 8,041,676$					
<i>Skill Level</i>	$\alpha_Z (Skill)$	$\beta_Z (Skill \times Exp)$	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$
Low-skilled	—	-0.012 <sup>†</sup>	0.016*	0.059**	0.069**
(s.e.)	—	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Medium-skilled	0.016**	0.004	—	0.043**	0.053**
(s.e.)	(0.005)	(0.007)	—	(0.007)	(0.007)
High-skilled	0.089**	0.047**	—	—	0.010 <sup>†</sup>
(s.e.)	(0.006)	(0.007)	—	—	(0.006)
Univ. Educated	0.161**	0.058**	—	—	—
(s.e.)	(0.012)	(0.006)	—	—	—


<sup>†</sup> = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence

\* = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence.

\*\* = significant at  $\geq 99\%$  level of confidence

See Table 4 for list of other regressors.

Figure 4: Interpretation of Equation [2] Estimates



### Table 3: Estimates of Export Wage Premiums

#### Panel A: Contribution of Exports to *Within*-group Wage Inequality

##### I. Export Wage Premiums (percent)

$$\beta_Z \times X_i \times 100\%$$

Skill Category	Export Share		
	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Low-Skilled	-0.34†	-0.58†	-0.75†
Medium-Skilled	0.12	0.20	0.26
High-Skilled	1.42**	2.37**	3.08**
Univ. Educated	1.73**	2.88**	3.74**

##### II. Percentage of *Within*-group Wage Inequality due to Export Wage Premium

$$\left[ \frac{(\beta_Z \times X_i)}{(\alpha_Z + (\beta_Z \times X_i))} \right] \times 100\%$$

Skill Category	Export Share		
	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Medium-Skilled	6.9	11.1	13.9
High-Skilled	13.7**	20.9**	25.6**
Univ. Educated	9.7**	15.2**	18.9**

**Table 3: Estimates of Export Wage Premiums (cont.)****Panel B: Contribution of Exports to *Between*-group Wage Inequality****III. Differences in Export Wage Premiums *Between* Skill Groups by Export Share**

$$([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i) \times 100\%$$

Percentile	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$			$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$			$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$		
	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>
Low-Skilled	0.5*	0.8*	1.0*	1.8**	2.9**	3.8**	2.1**	3.5**	4.5**
Medium-Skilled				1.3**	2.2**	2.8**	1.6**	2.7**	3.5**
High-Skilled							3.1†	5.1†	6.7†

**IV. Percentage of *Between*-group Wage Inequality due to Differences in Export Wage Premiums**

$$\left[ \frac{([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i)}{([\alpha_{Z'} - \alpha_Z] + ([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i))} \right] \times 100\%$$

Percentile				<i>High - Z</i>			<i>Univ. - Z</i>		
	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>
Medium-Skilled				15**	23**	28**	10**	16**	19**
High-Skilled							4†	7†	9†

## And the Losers Are ...

**Table 4: Largest Export Wage Discounts by Occupation**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Wage Discount (in percent)</i>	<i>Predominant Skill-group</i>
Wood preparers	- 9.39%	Low-skilled
Flour, food processors	- 4.88%	Low-skilled
Office auxiliary workers	- 4.06%	Low-/high-skilled
Meat, sausage good makers	- 3.64%	Low-skilled
Packagers, goods receivers	- 3.29%	Low-skilled
Plastic processors	- 3.23%	Low-skilled
Toolmakers	- 2.51%	Medium-skilled
Stores, transport workers	- 2.25%	Low-skilled
Transportation equipment drivers	- 2.07%	Low-skilled

Note: Based on results from Table 2, Panel C, plant-individual fixed effects, at least 15,000 employees per occupation; only manufacturing plants with at least 10 employees included; all reported coefficients on wage premia/discounts are significant at least at the 90 percent confidence level.



## And the Winners Are ...

**Table 5: Largest Export Wage Premia by Occupation**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Wage Premium (in percent)</i>	<i>Predominant Skill-group</i>
Foreman, master mechanics	11.63%	Medium-skilled
Management consultants	8.39%	Univ.educated
Electrical engineers	8.28%	High-skilled
Economic and social scientists	8.08%	Univ.educated
Other engineers	7.17%	Univ.educated
Entrepreneurs, managing directors	7.15%	Univ.educated
Cost accountants, valuers	6.74%	High-skilled
Wholesale and retail trade buyers	6.60%	High-skilled
Data processing specialists	6.44%	High-skilled
Mechanical, motor engineers	6.23%	Univ.educated

Note: Based on results from Table 2, Panel C, plant-individual fixed effects, at least 15,000 employees per occupation; only manufacturing plants with at least 10 employees included; all reported coefficients on wage premia/discounts are significant at least at the 90 percent confidence level.

## Robustness

- Is the plant's technology state-of-the-art?
  - Is product innovation relevant?
  - Are observable productivity gains driving the results?
  - Is it rather size-premium or skill-premium?
  - Occupation-specific time-trends as an alternative hypothesis?
- No, our results on export wage premia across skill-groups hold.

**Table 8: Alternative Hypotheses to the Export Wage Premia, by Skill Level**

$\beta_z(\text{Skill} \times \text{Exp})$	Benchmark Tab. 5 C	$Y=\text{Labor}$ productivity	$Y=\text{Size}$ (log employment)	$Y=\text{Share of}$ Univ. Educated	$Y=\text{Technology}$	$Y=\text{New}$ tech/prod.	Occupation time trend
Low-skilled (s.e.)	-0.012† (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.013† (0.007)	-0.038* (0.018)	-0.026* (0.013)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.006)
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.006 (0.006)
High-skilled (s.e.)	0.047** (0.007)	0.048** (0.008)	0.048** (0.007)	0.025† (0.013)	0.037** (0.013)	0.066** (0.020)	0.047** (0.008)
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	0.058** (0.006)	0.057** (0.008)	0.057** (0.007)	0.044** (0.008)	0.043** (0.014)	0.087** (0.031)	0.055** (0.007)
$\gamma_z(\text{Skill} \times Y)$							
Low-skilled (s.e.)	—	-0.000 (0.000)	0.037** (0.007)	-0.156* (0.078)	-0.006** (0.002)	0.000 (0.020)	—
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	—	0.000 (0.000)	0.035** (0.007)	0.003 (0.108)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.008 (0.016)	—
High-Skilled (s.e.)	—	0.001** (0.000)	0.033** (0.006)	0.332** (0.068)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.016)	—
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	—	0.001* (0.000)	0.035** (0.007)	0.314** (0.524)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.024)	—
$\delta_z(\text{Skill} \times Y \times \text{Exp})$							
Low-skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.220* (0.110)	0.007 (0.005)	—	—
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.043 (0.122)	0.006 (0.005)	—	—
High-Skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.012 (0.087)	0.005 (0.005)	—	—
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	—	—	—	-0.044 (0.035)	0.006 (0.005)	—	—
No. of Obs.	7,071,930	7,071,930	7,071,930	7,071,930	6,457,769	2,426,542	7,071,930

† sig. at 90% to 95% level of significance; \*\* sig. at 95% to 99% level of significance; \*\*\* significant at  $\geq 99\%$  level of significance. Firm-employee spell- and year-fixed effects in all specifications. See Table 4 for list of other regressors. Only manufacturing plants with at least 10 employees are included. Estimates weight observations by inverse drawing probability. The specification  $Y=\text{new tech/prod.}$  covers only 5 years.

## Gender, Nationality, and Export Wage Premia

- Increasing competitive pressure makes it more costly for individuals and firms to discriminate (Becker, 1957).
- Black and Strahan (2001) find that banking sector deregulation led to a stronger fall in wages for men than women.
- Black and Brainerd (2004) show that the gender wage gap decreased from 1976 to 1993 in the United States in industries with higher import competition → reduction in ability to discriminate.
- Mixed evidence on Becker's hypothesis for emerging markets (Joliffe and Campos, 2005; Berik et al., 2004).

## Gender, Nationality, and Export Wage Premia by Skill Level (eq. 3)

$$\ln W_{i,j,t} = \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z S_{i \in Z,t} + \Psi I_{i,t} + \Omega P_{j,t} + \tau_t + F_{i,j,t} +$$

$$+ D_i \left( \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z^D (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=1}^4 \alpha_Z^D S_{i \in Z,t} \right) + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- where  $D_i$  equals
  - 1 if the individual is a women (in one set of regressions considering gender differences), or
  - 1 if the individual is not a German citizen (in another set of regressions analyzing differences in wages between foreigners and others).
- Plant-occupation fixed effects.

**Table 7: Export Wage Premium for Women**

<i>P</i> × <i>O</i> , Plant-Occupation FE		R <sup>2</sup> =0.774	No. obs. = 8,041,676	
<i>Skill Level</i>	$\alpha_z$ ( <i>Skill</i> )	$\beta_z$ ( <i>Skill</i> × <i>Exp</i> )	$\alpha_z^D$ ( <i>Women</i> )	$\beta_z^D$ ( <i>Women</i> )
Low Skill	—	-0.003	-0.178**	0.052**
(s.e.)	—	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.011)
Medium Skill	0.079**	-0.024**	-0.178**	0.052*
(s.e.)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.028)
High Skill	0.227**	0.010	-0.303**	0.067**
(s.e.)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Univ. Educated	0.371**	0.055**	-0.299*	0.400*
(s.e.)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.021)

## Export Wage Premium for Women, by Export Share Percentile

<i>Skill Level</i>	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Low Skill	0.015**	0.026**	0.034**
(s.e.)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Medium Skill	0.008	0.013	0.017
(s.e.)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.013)
High Skill	0.022**	0.036**	0.048**
(s.e.)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Univ. Educated	0.026**	0.049**	0.059**
(s.e.)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.012)

Note: Other control variables as in Table 4.

**Table 8: Export Wage Premium for Foreigners**

$P \times O$ , Plant-Occupation FE		$R^2=0.774$	No. obs. = 8,041,676	
<i>Skill Level</i>	$\alpha_z$ ( <i>Skill</i> )	$\beta_z$ ( <i>Skill</i> $\times$ <i>Exp</i> )	$\alpha_z^D$ ( <i>Foreigner</i> )	$\beta_z^D$ ( <i>Foreigner</i> )
Low Skill	—	0.016*	-0.008	-0.008
(s.e.)	—	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Medium Skill	0.076**	-0.023**	-0.026**	0.035**
(s.e.)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.012)
High Skill	0.192**	0.030**	-0.025†	0.058*
(s.e.)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.023)
Univ. Educated	0.354**	0.058**	-0.020	0.074*
(s.e.)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.033)

## Export Wage Premium for Foreigners, by Export Share Percentile

<i>Skill Level</i>	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Low Skill	0.002	0.004	0.005
(s.e.)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Medium Skill	0.004	0.006	0.008
(s.e.)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.009)
High Skill	0.025**	0.042**	0.055**
(s.e.)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Univ. Educated	0.037**	0.062**	0.082**
(s.e.)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.021)

Note: Other control variables as in Table 4.


## Conclusions

- Significant export wage premium for higher-skilled workers and a significant export wage discount for lower-skilled workers, using a matched employer-employee dataset for German manufacturing establishments.
- Evidence for *within*-group and *between*-group wage inequality.
- Up to 30 percent of the overall skill premia associated with exporting.
- These differences would tend to exacerbate effects of trade on inequality as trade expands.
- But while the export activity contributes to conditional *wage inequality* along the dimension of skill, it reduces gender-based and nationality-based conditional wage inequality (*wage discrimination*).



Thank you for your attention.

## Distribution of Export Share - Employee Data



Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research.

**Table 2: Effect of Export Share on Wages, By Skill Level (cont.)**

**Panel B:  $P \times O$ , Plant-Occupation FE**  $R^2 = 0.77$   $n = 8,041,676$

<i>Skill Level</i>	$\alpha_Z$ ( <i>Skill</i> )	$\beta_Z$ ( <i>Skill</i> × <i>Exp</i> )	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$
Low-skilled (s.e.)	– –	0.014 <sup>†</sup> (0.007)	-0.034** (0.009)	0.018 <sup>†</sup> (0.011)	0.048** (0.015)
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	0.074** (0.004)	-0.020** (0.007)	– –	0.053** (0.010)	0.082** (0.014)
High-skilled (s.e.)	0.191** (0.006)	0.032** (0.008)	– –	– –	0.029* (0.012)
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	0.353** (0.008)	0.062** (0.012)	– –	– –	– –

<sup>†</sup> = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence

\* = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence.

\*\* = significant at  $\geq 99\%$  level of confidence

See Table 4 for list of other regressors.

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**Table 2: Effect of Export Share on Wages, By Skill Level**

<b>Panel A: P, Plant FE</b>		$R^2 = 0.67$		$n = 8,041,676$	
<i>Skill Level</i>	$\alpha_Z (Skill)$	$\beta_Z (Skill \times Exp)$	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$
Low-skilled (s.e.)	– –	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.052** (0.009)	0.096** (0.012)	0.095** (0.016)
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	0.131** (0.004)	-0.056** (0.009)	– –	0.148** (0.013)	0.147** (0.015)
High-skilled (s.e.)	0.330** (0.006)	0.092** (0.010)	– –	– –	-0.001 (0.014)
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	0.622** (0.008)	0.092** (0.014)	– –	– –	– –

† = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence

\* = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence.

\*\* = significant at  $\geq 99\%$  level of confidence

See Table 4 for list of other regressors.

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## Is It Technology (eq. 4)?


$$\ln W_{i,j,t} = \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z S_{i \in Z,t} + \Psi I_{i,t} + \Omega P_{j,t} + \tau_t + F_{i,j,t} + \\ + T_{j,t} \left( \sum_{Z=1}^4 \beta_Z^T (S_{i \in Z,t} \times X_{j,t}) + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z^T S_{i \in Z,t} \right) + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- where  $T_{j,t}$  is variable that runs from 1 (state-of-the-art) to 5 (obsolete), reporting the the establishment's self-assessment of its technology as compared to its industry competitors.
- In brief, technology apparently does not explain the observed export wage premia.

**Table 8: Alternative Hypotheses to the Export Wage Premia, by Skill Level**


$\beta_z(\text{Skill} \times \text{Exp})$	Benchmark Tab. 5 C	$Y=\text{Labor}$ productivity	$Y=\text{Size}$ (log employment)	$Y=\text{Share of}$ Univ. Educated	$Y=\text{Technology}$	$Y=\text{New}$ tech/prod.	Occupation time trend
Low-skilled (s.e.)	-0.012† (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.013† (0.007)	-0.038* (0.018)	-0.026* (0.013)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.006)
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.006 (0.006)
High-skilled (s.e.)	0.047** (0.007)	0.048** (0.008)	0.048** (0.007)	0.025† (0.013)	0.037** (0.013)	0.066** (0.020)	0.047** (0.008)
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	0.058** (0.006)	0.057** (0.008)	0.057** (0.007)	0.044** (0.008)	0.043** (0.014)	0.087** (0.031)	0.055** (0.007)
$\gamma_z(\text{Skill} \times Y)$							
Low-skilled (s.e.)	—	-0.000 (0.000)	0.037** (0.007)	-0.156* (0.078)	-0.006** (0.002)	0.000 (0.020)	—
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	—	0.000 (0.000)	0.035** (0.007)	0.003 (0.108)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.008 (0.016)	—
High-Skilled (s.e.)	—	0.001** (0.000)	0.033** (0.006)	0.332** (0.068)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.016)	—
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	—	0.001* (0.000)	0.035** (0.007)	0.314** (0.524)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.024)	—
$\delta_z(\text{Skill} \times Y \times \text{Exp})$							
Low-skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.220* (0.110)	0.007 (0.005)	—	—
Medium-skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.043 (0.122)	0.006 (0.005)	—	—
High-Skilled (s.e.)	—	—	—	0.012 (0.087)	0.005 (0.005)	—	—
Univ. Educated (s.e.)	—	—	—	-0.044 (0.035)	0.006 (0.005)	—	—
No. of Obs.	7,071,930	7,071,930	7,071,930	7,071,930	6,457,769	2,426,542	7,071,930

† sig. at 90% to 95% level of significance; \*\* sig. at 95% to 99% level of significance; \*\*\* significant at  $\geq 99\%$  level of significance. Firm-employee spell- and year-fixed effects in all specifications. See Table 4 for list of other regressors. Only manufacturing plants with at least 10 employees are included. Estimates weight observations by inverse drawing probability. The specification  $Y=\text{new tech/prod.}$  covers only 5 years.



## Evolution of Export Share

Share of exports by openness class from 1993 to 2007




Note: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research.  
Proportions are weighted by inverse drawing probabilities.



## Distribution of Export Share - Plant Data


Change in Proportion of Plants by Openness Class from 1993 to 2007







Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research.


## Distribution of Export Share - Employee Data

Change in Proportion of Employees by Openness Class from 1993 to 2007




Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research.





## Share of Dominant Type (*Facharbeiter* or *Angestellter*) Across 339 Occupations



**Table 2: Composition of Employees**

	All Plants	<i>Exporters</i>	<i>Non-Exporters</i>
No. Obs. (worker-year)	7,071,930	6,415,790	656,140
<b>Skill Composition</b>			
Low-skilled	0.345	0.368	0.271
Medium-skilled	0.341	0.309	0.446
High-skilled	0.242	0.239	0.247
Univ. Educated	0.072	0.083	0.036
Proportion Women	0.200	0.195	0.215
Proportion Non-Citizen	0.101	0.108	0.081

Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research; worker-year observations unweighted.

**Table 3: Wage by Worker Categories**

	All	<i>Exporters</i>	<i>Non-Exporters</i>	<i>Exp – Non.Exp</i>
All Workers	4.570	4.606	4.453	<b>0.153</b>
<b><i>ln Wages by Skill Level</i></b>				
Low-skilled	4.374	4.389	4.304	<b>0.085</b>
Medium-skilled	4.538	4.574	4.458	<b>0.116</b>
High-skilled	4.721	4.787	4.514	<b>0.273</b>
Univ. Educated	5.160	5.171	5.078	<b>0.093</b>
<b><i>ln Wages of Women by Skill Level</i></b>				
Low-skilled	4.178	4.198	4.074	<b>0.124</b>
Medium-skilled	4.155	4.194	4.109	<b>0.085</b>
High-skilled	4.407	4.514	4.179	<b>0.335</b>
Univ. Educated	4.838	4.843	4.803	<b>0.040</b>
<b><i>ln Wages of Non-German Citizens by Skill Level</i></b>				
Low-skilled	4.386	4.400	4.312	<b>0.088</b>
Medium-skilled	4.520	4.566	4.402	<b>0.164</b>
High-skilled	4.721	4.774	4.499	<b>0.275</b>
Univ. Educated	5.100	5.117	4.920	<b>0.197</b>

Source: LIAB, Institute for Employment Research, logarithm of wage in 2005 constant Euros.

## Overall Export Wage Premium (eq. 1)

$$\ln W_{i,j,t} = \beta X_{j,t} + \sum_{Z=2}^4 \alpha_Z S_{i \in Z,t} + \Psi I_{i,t} + \Omega P_{j,t} + \tau_t + F_{i,j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

- $W_{i,j,t}$  = log wage of worker  $i$  employed at plant  $j$  in year  $t$ .
- $X_{j,t}$  = share of exports at plant  $j$  in year  $t$ .
- $S_{i \in Z,t} = 1$  if worker  $i$  has skill level  $Z$ , else 0.
  - $Z = 1$  for low skill, 2 for medium skill, 3 for high skill, and 4 for college or university degree.
  - Omitted dummy is  $z = 1$ , the low-skill dummy.
- $I_{i,t}$  = characteristics of worker  $i$  in year  $t$  other than skill.
- $P_{j,t}$  = characteristics of the plant  $j$ , where  $i$  works.
- Fixed effects year in all specifications.
- Other fixed effects: plant, plant-occupation and plant-individual.
- Main coefficient of interest is  $\beta$ .



## Overall Export Wage Premium

- How do our estimates relate to the literature (not shown)?
- Our coefficient is 0.035 when no fixed effects are included (OLS), which yields an export wage premium of 1.7 percent at the median value of export share of 0.5.
- Substantially smaller than results based on plant-level observations, which cannot control for individual characteristics.
- But once we only control for logarithm of plant employment and year dummy → coefficient on export share of 0.153 or an export wage premium of nearly 8 percent (median value of exports).

# Overall Export Wage Premium

- From here on slides not updated yet.

**Table 4: Effect of Export Share on Wages,  
Not Differentiating by Skill level**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>P×O</i>	<i>P×I</i>
Export Share (j) (s.e.)	0.064** (0.010)	0.018** (0.007)	0.018** (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)
Medium Skill (i) (s.e.)	0.133** (0.004)	0.118** (0.003)	0.063** (0.003)	0.019** (0.005)
High Skill (i) (s.e.)	0.387** (0.005)	0.367** (0.004)	0.197** (0.005)	0.104** (0.006)
College/ Univ. Educ. (i) (s.e.)	0.752** (0.006)	0.706** (0.005)	0.398** (0.007)	0.256** (0.018)
Woman (i) (s.e.)	-0.328** (0.006)	-0.287** (0.004)	-0.215** (0.003)	— —
Non-German (i) (s.e.)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.022** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.57	0.67	0.77	0.93
No. of Observations	8,041,676	8,041,676	8,041,676	8,041,676

† = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence

\* = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence.

\*\* = significant at ≥ 99% level of confidence

Fixed Effects year in all specifications. Other fixed effects include plant (*P*), plant-occupation (*P×O*), and plant-individual (*P×I*).

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**Table 4: Effect of Export Share on Wages,  
Not Differentiating by Skill level (cont.)**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>P × O</i>	<i>P × I</i>
ln(Tenure) (i) (s.e.)	0.025** (0.002)	0.037** (0.001)	0.036** (0.001)	0.016** (0.002)
ln(Experience) (i) (s.e.)	0.085** (0.002)	0.072** (0.001)	0.062** (0.001)	0.042** (0.002)
ln(Plant employ.) (j) (s.e.)	0.045** (0.002)	0.009 (0.007)	0.016* (0.007)	0.046** (0.007)
Single Plant Co. (j) (s.e.)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)
In a Holding Co. (j) (s.e.)	0.033** (0.006)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Work Council (j) (s.e.)	0.075** (0.008)	0.005 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.57	0.67	0.77	0.93
No. of Observations	8,041,676	8,041,676	8,041,676	8,041,676

† = sig. at 90% to 95% level of confidence

\* = sig. at 95% to 99% level of confidence.

\*\* = significant at ≥ 99% level of confidence

Fixed Effects year in all specifications.

Other fixed effects include plant (*P*), plant-occupation (*P × O*), and plant-individual (*P × I*).

## Table 6: Estimates of Export Wage Premia

### I. Export Wage Premia (percent)

$$\beta_z \times X_i \times 100\%$$

Skill Category	Export Share		
	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Low-skilled	-0.63**	-1.05**	-1.40**
Medium-skilled	-0.15	-0.25	-0.33
High-skilled	1.56**	2.60**	3.40**
Univ. Educated	3.24**	5.40**	7.02**

### II. Percent of Wage Premium Due to Export Wage Premium

$$\left[ \frac{(\beta_z \times X_i)}{(\alpha_z + (\beta_z \times X_i))} \right] \times 100\%$$

Skill Category	Export Share		
	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	50 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile
Medium-skilled	-10.9	-19.7	-27.2
High-skilled	16.2**	24.4**	29.6**
Univ. Educated	13.3**	20.4**	25.0**

Calculations based on estimates for plant-individual fixed effects regressions in Table 5; standard errors available on request.

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## Table 6: Estimates of Export Wage Premiums (cont.)

III. Differences in Export Wage Premia by Export Share Values – Export-induced Skill Premia  $([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i) \times 100\%$

Percentile	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$			$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$			$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$		
	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>
Low-skilled	0.48*	0.80*	1.03*	2.19**	3.64**	4.75**	3.86**	6.43**	8.36**
Medium-skilled				1.71**	2.86**	3.71**	3.38**	5.64**	7.33**
High-skilled							1.67†	2.78†	3.61†

IV. Proportion of Overall Skill Premia Due to Export-induced Skill Premia

$$\left[ \frac{([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i)}{([\alpha_{Z'} - \alpha_Z] + ([\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z] \times X_i))} \right] \times 100\%$$

Percentile	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>
Medium-skilled				20.6**	30.2**	36.0**	14.8**	22.4**	27.3**
High-skilled							11.4†	17.7*	21.8*
Univ. Educated									

Calculations based on estimates for plant-individual fixed effects regressions in Table 5, standard errors available on request.

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## Table 6: Estimates of Export Wage Premiums (cont.)

V. Differences in Export Wage Premiums with Increasing Export Share Values

$$(\beta_{Z'} - \beta_Z)(X_{75th} - X_{25th}) \times 100\%$$

	$\beta_{Medium} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{High} - \beta_Z$	$\beta_{Univ.} - \beta_Z$
	75 <sup>th</sup> – 25 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup> – 25 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup> – 25 <sup>th</sup>
Low-Skilled	0.56*	2.56**	4.50**
Medium-Skilled		2.00**	3.94**
High-Skilled			1.94†

Calculations based on estimates for plant-individual fixed effects regressions in Table 5, standard errors available on request.

## Literature Review (I)

- ***Export Wage Premium - Plant-level data:***
  - United States (Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999, 2004), Germany (Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Arnold and Hussinger, 2005; Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007), Korea (Hahn, 2004), Spain (Farinas and Martin-Marcos, 2003), Sweden (Hansson and Lundin, 2004) and the United Kingdom (Greenaway and Yu, 2004).
  
- ***Export Wage Premium - Linked employer-employee data:***
  - Germany (Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007, 2010), Denmark (Munch and Skaksen, 2008), Mexico (Frias, Kaplan and Verhoogen, 2009) and Portugal (Martins and Opromella, 2009).



## Literature Review (II)

- ***Trade Theory and Wage Inequality:***
  - Melitz (2003), Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2008), Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2007, 2008, 2009).
- ***Wage Discrimination:***
  - Becker (1957), Black and Strahan (2001), Black and Brainerd (2004), Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebner (2007), Oostendorp (2009).
- ***Empirical Strategy:***
  - Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), Andrews, Schank and Upward (2006).