

# Is the Dragon Learning to Fly? China's Patent Explosion At Home and Abroad

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Patenting in China and the United States
- 3 Data
- 4 Descriptive Analysis
- 5 Empirical Strategy and Regression Results
- 6 Concluding Remarks

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


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  - will China **wipe the floor with the competition** (dominance),
  - or will we get an **outcome somewhere inbetween** these extremes?



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  - ⑤ **Who is behind the patent explosion? What do these patents protect?**

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  - **Characteristics of firms who chose to file/file lots with USPTO** (rather than only in China).

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- The Dragon is not airborne yet, still **flapping its wings in preparation for flight**.

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- **Industrial applicability** criterion for SIPO more in line with EPO than 'liberal' USPTO.
- Substantially **higher fees** to take out and maintain a patent with USPTO than SIPO. ⇒ higher cost for USPTO patents during our sample period.



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- ③ **'Bridge'** that links the firm-level data with patent data: Bureau van Dijk (BvD) **Oriana** (*names in English, unique firm id shared with ASIE*). Selection into Oriana unclear.

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## USPTO: Top 10 firms (1985-2006)

Rank	Company	#Patents	Share
1	Hongfujin Precision Industry (Foxconn)	513	26.42%
2	Huawei Technology	399	20.55%
3	Fuzhun Precision Industry (Foxconn)	215	11.07%
4	China Petroleum Chemical (Sinopec)	161	8.29%
5	Semiconductor Manufacturing Intern.	126	6.49%
6	Futaihong Precision Industry (Foxconn)	100	5.15%
7	ZTE	61	3.14%
8	Lenovo	38	1.96%
9	BYD	33	1.70%
10	China International Marine Containers	18	0.93%
	Other	278	14.32%
	Total	1,942	100.00%

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1	Huawei Technology	15,603	34.09%
2	ZTE	4,594	10.04%
3	LG Electronics Appliances Tianjin	4,244	9.27%
4	Hongfujin Precision Industry (Foxconn)	3,710	8.11%
5	China Petroleum Chemical (Sinopec)	1,977	4.32%
6	Lenovo	1,137	2.48%
7	BYD	835	1.82%
8	LG Electronics Shanghai	775	1.69%
9	Baoshan Iron & Steel	756	1.65%
10	Inventec Shanghai	711	1.55%
	Other	11,423	24.96%
	Total	45,765	100.00%



# Product vs. Process Innovation (1985-2006)

Innovation Type	USPTO		SIPO	
	Share	#Patents	Share	#Patents
Product	46.8%	895	29.9%	293
Process	20.3%	389	36.9%	362
Product & Process	32.8%	628	33.2%	325
Total	100.00%	1,912	100.00%	980

**Notes:** Figures are based on manual investigation of claims of all USPTO patents and a random sample of SIPO patents.

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- **Present only a small share of results** for sample of ~ 20,000 manufacturing firms (64,000 firm-years). Reduced sample since 'R&D expenditure' (innovation effort) only available in select years. Sample selection from ASIE into integrated sample is addressed.

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- The nature of this data and the concentration of patenting uncovered by our study creates **formidable challenges for econometric analysis**, conclusions should be judged against these concerns.

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- Repeat the above exercise for **firms in ICT equipment sectors** only to confirm results.

# Patenting Decision

Dep. Var. Selection	Bivariate Probit			Trivariate Probit	
	USPTO	SIPO	H ‡	USPTO	SIPO
	-	-		×	×
<b>log R&amp;D pw</b>	0.190 [0.027]**	0.159 [0.011]**	.25	0.188 [0.027]**	0.161 [0.010]**
<b>(log R&amp;D pw)<sup>2</sup></b>	0.025 [0.007]**	0.014 [0.003]**	.07	0.022 [0.006]**	0.013 [0.003]**
<b>log Workers</b>	0.397 [0.041]**	0.271 [0.022]**	.00	0.527 [0.034]**	0.479 [0.015]**
<b>log Exp/Sales</b>	0.286 [0.063]**	-0.052 [0.011]**	.00	0.257 [0.060]**	-0.047 [0.011]**
<b>log Firm age</b>	-0.213 [0.060]**	-0.040 [0.023]	.00	-0.151 [0.050]**	0.026 [0.019]
$\rho^S$ (st.error)				.372 [.027]**	.508 [.011]**
$\rho^P$ (st.error)		.733 [.034]**			.612 [.036]**
obs		64,652			848,441
Firms		19,956			392,441

Notes: Among other covariates not reported: constant, ownership (insign.) and year dummies (sign.). Clustered st.errors (firm-level). Diagnostic tests in the paper. Dep. var. in each case is a dummy (1=patent, 0=no patent; 1=inclusion in Oriana for selection equation). ‡ *p*-values for cross-equation homogeneity test.

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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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
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⇒ Based on our analysis: No.
- ③ **‘Is China falling into the Middle-Income Trap?’**,  
**‘Is there evidence for a pure Red Queen Run?’**  
⇒ There are some (albeit few) very innovative, global players based in China.

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- ① **‘What is behind the Chinese patent explosion?’**  
⇒ A handful of firms.
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⇒ Based on our analysis: No.
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# Thank you.

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