Inter-regional mobility in the accession countries: A comparison with EU15 member states

Peter Huber*

This paper uses a data set covering 9 EU15 member states and 7 candidate countries and new member states to compare inter-regional migration patterns in the 1990s. We find that the level of migration is lower in candidate countries and new member states than in EU15 member states. Also in contrast to the EU15 member states, migration has fallen in candidate countries and new member states. This casts doubt on the viability of migration as an adjustment mechanism. Estimating place-to-place models of migration we find that migration is less reactive to regional disparities in candidate countries and new member states than it is in EU15 member states. If reaction to labor market disparities were similar to EU15 states, net migration should increase by a factor of between 2 and over 10.

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1 Introduction

The stylized fact of low migration rates in Europe has been repeatedly documented. Decressin/Fatas (1995), Fatas (2000), Obstfeld/Peri (2000) and Puhani (2001) find that migration contributes only moderately to the reduction of differences in regional labor market conditions in European Union (EU) member states. Recent evidence suggests that migration is an even less efficient mechanism for equilibrating regional labor markets in candidate countries and new member states. Fidrmuc (2004) finds that overall internal mobility in the new EU member states is low and inefficient at reducing regional disparities. Ederveen/Bardsley (2003) find that migrants in the candidate countries and new member states are less responsive to regional wage and employment disparities than is the case in EU15 member states, and Drinkwater (2003) reports that the willingness to migrate across regions and national borders is at the lower end of the distribution among European countries. Cseres-Gergeley (2002), Hazans (2003), Kallai (2003) and Fidrmuc/Huber (2003) provide case studies on Hungary, the Baltics, Romania and the Czech Republic to provide further evidence on low migration rates in candidate countries and new member states.

The potential economic and political consequences of this lack of labor mobility have been repeatedly stressed. Low internal migration increases mismatch unemployment and will thus contribute to high nation-wide unemployment (Boeri/Scarpetta 1996). Aside from causing social problems, this may also have political implications. In the long run higher unemployment rates may lead to increased demands for regional transfers. This in turn may cause dissatisfaction on the side of those parts of the population financing regional transfers and may lead to the disintegration of political unions. Furthermore, lack of migration impinges on the short-run adjustment capabilities of regional labor markets to asymmetric shocks (Eichengreen 1998). Lacking migration may thus also hamper the viability of monetary unions. Since exchange rate fluctuations are impossible in monetary unions, the absence of migration results in adjustment to asymmetric shocks through wages, unemployment or participation rates. To the extent that these adjustment mechanisms are socially or politically less desirable than migration, low migration rates will result in social and political costs from the EMU (Fidrmuc 2003).

Despite these profound implications, little is known about the causes of low migration in Europe. A number of explanations have been put forward to account for this puzzle, such as inefficiencies in spatial matching (Faini et al. 1997), the effects of social transfers on the search incentives of the unemployed (Fredriksson 1999), housing market imperfections (Cameron/Muellbauer 1998) and cultural differences as reflected for instance in attitudes towards risk (Bentivogli/Pagano 1999). A final verdict on which of these factors is decisive, however, has not been reached.

In this paper we use data on inter-regional migration in the 1990s for nine EU15 member states and seven countries that either joined the EU in 2004 or are negotiating membership, in order to compare regional migration patterns. Our goals are twofold. First, we explore the stylized facts of migration in candidate countries and new member states and compare them with EU15 member states. In the next section we thus describe migratory moves in the two regions. We highlight a number of differences in migration patterns. Inter-regional migration in particular is low by EU15 standards in candidate countries and new member states and fell throughout the 1990s. A smaller share of migration is accounted for by persons of working age and in both regions around 90% of all measured migration flows are churning flows, which contribute little to the equilibration of aggregate regional disparities. We also present evidence that a substantial part of migration covers only short distances and that migration rates are strongly correlated over time. This suggests that migration presents a rather protracted and sluggish adjustment mechanism to regional disparities.

Second, we compare the responsiveness of migration to regional income and labor market disparities by estimating place-to-place models of migration. We estimate a model suggested by Bentivogli/Pagano (1999), incorporating risk aversion in section three. In contrast to earlier comparative work, this allows us to estimate directly the elasticity of migration with respect to regional income and employment rate disparities in both EU15 member states and candidate countries and new member states. We find that both net and gross migration are less reactive to regional employment rate and income disparities in the candidate countries and new member states and that attitudes towards risk play a minor role, but geographic factors a major role in determining migration. We also show that net migration should increase by a factor of between 2 and 10 in the candidate countries and new member states if it were as responsive to regional disparities as it is in Spain, Italy or the Nether-
lands. Section four finally concludes the paper by drawing some policy conclusions and outlining potential directions for further research.

2 Stylized facts

We use internal migration data for the 1990s on nine European Union countries namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK, and seven countries which have either completed negotiations for membership or are still negotiating accession namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania. All data were taken from Eurostat’s Cronos database. As shown in Table 1 these data vary in scope and content. In particular, the data refer to different regional units in different countries. For most countries the data refer to NUTS II regions, but for Denmark, Estonia and Slovenia, data are available only at the NUTS III level, while in Germany and the UK they only cover NUTS I regions. These differences in regional disaggregation imply substantial differences in region size. For instance, the largest territories in terms of average population are the German and UK NUTS I regions and the smallest regions are the NUTS III regions of Slovenia, Estonia and Denmark. Average size also varies considerably for regional units at the same level of regional disaggregation. In terms of population the largest NUTS II regions are in Italy, with 2.9 million inhabitants, and the smallest in Austria, with 898,000.\(^2\)

The data also differ with respect to the time period covered.\(^3\) For Germany for instance data are only available up to 1993 and in Slovakia only the year

\(^1\)These differences in size could be a problem for empirical results, because one would expect measured migration to increase with decreasing region size. The new member states and candidate countries (with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia) are by and large comparable with the EU15 member states in this respect, however. Furthermore, to the degree that the regions of the new member states and candidate countries are smaller than those of the EU15 member states we would expect higher rather than lower migration rates. Finally, in previous research (Huber 2004) we show that average region size is a less important determinant of internal migration rates relative to other institutional variables.

\(^2\)For a number of EU member states data are available going as far back as the 1970s. We limit our analysis to the 1990s to provide for similar time periods for current EU15 member states and candidate countries.
2000 is available. Thus in an attempt to maximize the available information, we conduct our descriptive analysis for two sample years: 1992 and 1999.\textsuperscript{4} We depart from this rule only in the cases of Poland, where we report data from 1990 instead of 1992, and for Slovakia where data from the year 2000 are taken instead of 1999. Furthermore, most of the data collected are place-to-place data. For two countries (Romania and Slovakia), however, place-to-place information is not available.\textsuperscript{5} Thus we cannot conduct an analysis at the same depth for these countries.

2.1 Net and gross migratory moves

In Table 2 we report the number of migrants changing their region of residence as a percentage of the country’s population in 1992 and 1999 respectively. This indicator has been used as a measure of overall mobility by a number of authors (e.g. Fatas 2000, Faini et al. 1997, Bentolila 1999). Formally, it can be defined as half of the sum of all outflows and inflows across regions:\textsuperscript{6}

\[
GF = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{i} (O_i + M_i)}{\sum_{i} POP_i} \right\}
\]

where GF stands for gross migration flows as a share of the total population, O\textsubscript{i} and M\textsubscript{i} are the migrant outflows and inflows from region i respectively, and POP\textsubscript{i} is the population of region i.

Gross migration may, however, be a misleading indicator, because a substantial part of migration is accounted for by churning flows, where people move in and out of the same region.\textsuperscript{7} Most macroeconomic models, which regard migration as an equilibrating mechanism in the face of regional disparities, focus on net migration. Thus measures of net migration should capture better the efficiency of inter-regional migration flows in equilibrating regional disparities in unemployment and income. This can be measured as the sum absolute values of the difference between emigration and immigration across regions:

\[
NF = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{i} |O_i - M_i|}{\sum_{i} POP_i} \right\}
\]

and net flows as a share of the total flows is:\textsuperscript{8}

\[
SNF = \frac{\sum_{i} |O_i - M_i|}{\sum_{i} (O_i + M_i)} \approx \frac{NF}{GF}
\]

The results of this decomposition (see Table 2) do not suggest that migration is a viable mechanism for regional adjustment in Europe. Although there is some variance across countries, migration is low in EU15 member states and even lower in candidate countries and new member states. In the average EU15 member state around 1% of the population changes region of residence during one year. Gross migration rates are substantially lower than 1% only in Italy and Spain. In the candidate countries and new member states gross migration rates exceed the 1% mark only in Romania and Hungary and are around or below 0.5% in most countries.

Furthermore, in contrast to the EU15 member states, where gross migration has stagnated or even increased over the period from 1992 to 1999, migration rates have fallen in all candidate countries and new member states for which we have data for both time periods. This finding is consistent with a number of results reported by other authors researching migration patterns in the candidate countries and new member states (Kallai 2004, Hazans 2004, Fidrmuc/Huber 2004) but stands in stark contrast to the increase in regional disparities found in much of the literature on regional development (Egger/Huber/Pfaffermayr 2004, Petrakos 1995, Huber/Palme 2001, Gorzelak 1996), which suggests that regional divergence predominated in the last decade in the candidate countries and new member states and thus incentives to migrate should have increased rather than decreased.

The low effectiveness of migration at reducing regional disparities is underlined by the net migration

4 We performed a similar analysis as below for other years as well as for data at different regional aggregations in earlier versions of this paper. The results of that analysis are comparable with those presented below and are available from the author.

5 Furthermore, in Poland data for 1990 are not place-to-place data and the breakdown by age groups and gender presented below is also not available on a place-to-place basis.

6 Division by two is necessary to avoid double counting since each outflow for one region is also an inflow for another region.

7 These churning flows can be explained either by heterogeneity of individual tastes and characteristics or regional demand for labor (Fields 1979), or by different life-cycle positions of individuals (e.g. students migrating to their place of education). Mueser (1997) shows that churning may also occur among ex-ante homogenous individuals due to endogenous wealth effects arising, for instance, from land price increases. Finally, spatial search models (Jackman/Savouri 1990, Molho 2000, Juarez 2000) predict churning as a result of stochastic matching, if workers do not search exclusively in their region of residence.

8 This results from observing that :
rates. They rarely exceed 0.1% of the population in the candidate countries and new member states and have fallen in all countries but the Czech Republic. In EU15 member states by contrast, net migration flows at least approach the 0.1% level in all countries but Austria and the Netherlands, and the evidence concerning a decline is less ubiquitous. Thus a substantial part of migration (around 90%) in both regions is due to churning flows, which contribute little to the narrowing of aggregate regional disparities.

2.2 Regional and demographic structure

Our data refer to population moves. This may distort results concerning labor migration, if some migration is undertaken for reasons other than economic activity. Examples of such migration may be students moving to their place of education or pensioners moving to retire. Furthermore, as noted for example by Cameron/Muellbauer (1998) migration between neighboring regions and within urban agglomerations may be motivated primarily by housing motives, if residents of one region (such as a city) move to another (such as the suburbs) without changing their workplace. Such migration is obviously not associated with income or unemployment disparities between regions, but is motivated by cheaper housing, better educational infrastructure or better living conditions in the receiving region. Thus it will do little to equilibrate regional labor market disparities, since the effective labor supply remains unchanged in both the sending and the receiving region.

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9 Interestingly the increase in net migration in the Czech Republic is primarily due to the increase in migration from Prague to its environs (see: Fidrmuc/Huber 2003).
While with our data it is impossible to gauge the exact extent of such migration which is not motivated by labor-market factors, some indication is available. First, for a number of countries we have available migration by age groups and gender.\textsuperscript{10} This allows us to estimate the share of the working-age population (aged between 20 and 64) in total migration i.e., of those that at least theoretically could move for labor market reasons. These data (see Table 3) suggest that the share of the working-age population in total migration is slightly lower in most candidate countries and new member states than in the EU15. In typical candidate countries and new member states, between 65\% and 70\% of the migrants are of working age (with the outliers being Romania with 74\% and Estonia with around 58\%). In the member states by contrast typically more than 70\% of the migrants are of working age. The only indicator where candidate countries and new member states have higher figures than EU15 member states is the share of female migrants. More than half of the migrants in candidate countries and new member states have higher figures than EU15 member states is the share of female migrants. More than half of the migrants in candidate countries and new member states are female. This may in part be explained by the higher participation rate of females in many candidate countries and new member states, leading to more labor-motivated migration among women.

Furthermore, for the countries where place-to-place data are available we can calculate the share of moves between neighboring regions as an indication of the relevance of short-distance moves, which are not associated with labor market motives. Shares of migration between neighboring regions may, however, be influenced by differences between countries as regards their geography, which may in turn lead to differences in the number of neighbor relationships and thus may influence the share of migration between neighboring regions. In column 3 of Table 4 we thus calculated the share of contingency relationships in a country.\textsuperscript{11} Comparing this share with the share of migration between neighboring regions gives an indication of the extent to which the share of short-distance moves between neighboring regions

\textsuperscript{10} Unfortunately, the data on the age and gender of migrants is not available on a place-to-place basis.

\textsuperscript{11} This is calculated by observing that in a country with n regions there are n*(n-1) pairs of sending and receiving regions (since migration within a region is not measured). If m of these pairs are contingent, the share of contingency relationships in the total number of pairs of sending and receiving regions is given by 

\[ s = \frac{m}{n(n-1)} \]
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exceeds the rate expected if migration were independent of distance. According to these statistics, flows between neighboring regions exceed their expected value by a factor of between 1.2 and 3.0. Thus a substantial part of migration in both candidate countries and new member states as well as EU15 member states is accounted for by short-distance moves.\textsuperscript{12}

Further doubt concerning the viability of migration as a mechanism for equilibrating regional disparities comes from correlating net migration rates (as a percentage of the resident population in a region) over time periods. These correlations are usually high and significant (see column 4 of Table 4). The correlation coefficients of net migration rates between regions at two points in time seven years apart are highly significant in all countries and may reach levels of up to 0.9. As recently pointed out by Rappaport (1999) this suggests that migration is not reactive to transitory shocks but reflects either the protracted adjustment to permanent shocks or differences in the steady state growth paths among regions.

### 2.3 Internal and external migration

Our data also exclusively measure internal migration. A number of recent papers, however, suggest that international and intra-country migration may be substitutes (Borjas 1999). If migrants from abroad are more likely to move to places with high wages and low unemployment rates, this may deter national migrants from moving to these places. Alternatively if potential emigrants in depressed regions are faced

\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, the limited evidence available suggests that long-distance moves declined more strongly in candidate countries between 1992 and 1999. In both Hungary and the Czech Republic moves covering a distance of more than 100 km were 18\% below their 1992 level, moves covering a distance of less than 100 km were 10\% below the 1990 level.
with a choice of moving to less depressed regions in their own country or abroad, the choice may be to move abroad if these regions offer even better conditions than regions at home.

Again this claim can be analyzed at least for a subset of countries in our data, for which we have available information on net external migration from the same data set. The information displayed in Table 5 suggests a low potential for this explanation. Although most candidate countries and new member states (except for Estonia) are net receiving countries for international migrants, the share of migrants received tends to be low. Similarly, emigration abroad does not seem to be a viable alternative to migration within a country. Most of the candidate countries and new member states for which data are available have gross external migration rates that are equal to the lower end of the EU15 distribution.13

Finally regional data suggest that rather than being substitutes, international migration is complementary to internal migration. Regions with high net immigration into the country also tend to be regions with high levels of emigration abroad. The correlation coefficient between the two is 0.45. Thus, it seems unlikely that high international migration rates compensate for low internal migration in candidate countries and new member states.

3 Estimating place-to-place models of migration

Descriptive statistics thus suggest that migration rates in the candidate countries and new member states are low even relative to EU15 figures and have fallen in the last decade. Furthermore, they indicate that a larger share of migration is accounted for by population moves not associated with labor market motives and that migration is highly auto-correlated. While this indicates that migration may be ineffective at reducing labor market disparities, it does not provide us with quantititative estimates. We therefore estimate a model of place-to-place migration to quantify differences in the responsiveness of migration to regional disparities. To motivate our choice of specification, we consider a model proposed by Benivogli/Pagano (1999). In this overlapping generations model, agents are assumed to live for two periods. At the beginning of the first period they decide whether they would like to live in their region of birth (labeled h) or whether they would prefer migration to

13 This is also due to restrictive immigration regulations in EU member states, which are the primary destination countries for emigrants from candidate countries.
another region (called a) within the country. After this decision has been made, in their first period of life agents are consumers in their chosen region of residence and either work receiving income of \( w_t \), which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean \( \mu_a \) and variance \( \sigma_i \) (with \( i \) an index for the region of residence i.e. \( i \epsilon \{a,b\} \)) or are registered as non-employed and receive an income from the informal sector of \( b \), which is assumed to be constant across all regions. Finally, in their second period of life agents retire and use their savings for consumption.

If at the beginning of the first period agents decide to migrate from their region of birth they incur migration costs, denoted by \( \theta_{ab} \). Bentivogli/Pagano (1999) show that under the assumption that \( \theta_{ab} \) is uniformly distributed in the interval \([p,z]\) with \( z-p=1 \) (where \( p \) depends on the relative attractiveness of regions as well as the costs of migration) among agents, the share of a region’s population moving from region \( h \) to \( a \) at time \( t \) (\( m_{ah} \)) can be written as:

\[
m_{ah} = \alpha (\mu_a - \mu_b) - ab (u_a t + u_b t) - \frac{\lambda}{2} (\sigma_a^2 - \sigma_b^2) - p_{ah} (4)
\]

with \( \alpha \) a function of the interest rate, and \( \lambda \) the absolute risk aversion coefficient and \( u_a \) and \( \sigma_i \) indicators of labor market tightness and the variance of regional income, respectively.

In empirically implementing equation (4) we include fixed effects to control for time invariant characteristics of regions such as amenities as well as psychological and financial costs associated with migration, and focus directly on net migration rates. In particular we perform two estimations. First we reformulate equation (4) as:

\[
\ln(m_{ah}) = \alpha \ln(\mu_a - \mu_b) - \beta \ln(u_a t + u_b t) + \gamma \ln(\sigma_a^2 - \sigma_b^2) - \Sigma_{a,b} h \theta_{ah} + \Sigma_i \tau_i + \xi_{ah} (5)
\]

where \( \theta_{ab} \) is a set of \( J \times (J-1) \) fixed effects for each pair of sending and receiving regions. These are included to control for all aspects of moving costs between two regions, e.g. the differences in regional amenities, the distance to be covered, contingency effects, differences in relationships between urban and suburban regions, and potential cultural differences within regions of countries that may increase psychological ban regions, and potential cultural differences within regions. These are included as a proxy for all aspects of moving costs between two regions.\(^{15}\)

Finally, several authors suggest different measures of labor market tightness in the specification of equations (5) and (6). Jackman/Savouri (1992) use vacancy rates in addition to unemployment rates, Juarez (2000) uses unemployment growth or employment rates, and Fields (1979) favors unemployment rates. Unfortunately comparable data for all countries are only available for employment rates (i.e. employment as a share of the resident working-age population). Therefore we focus on this measure of labor market tightness. Finally, as a proxy for the variability of GDP per capita we follow Bentiviogli/Pagano (1999) and use the standard deviation of GDP per capita over the last three years.\(^{16}\) We were also unable to secure data on these variables for all countries for the entire time period. In particular we have no data for the UK and we lack data on GDP for the countries reporting at NUTS III level (i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Slovenia) before 1995. Furthermore, for Italy and Spain we exclude from the estimation the island NUTS II regions of Sicily, Sardinia, the Canaries and the Balearic Islands.\(^{17}\)

Table 6 displays the results obtained by decomposing the standard deviation of these explanatory variables into a component due to the variance across sending-receiving region pairs (the between standard deviation) and into a component, due to variation across time (the within standard deviation). The first of these components gives some indication of the size of

\[^{14}\text{Preference was given to net migration because we want to focus on the potential of migration to equilibrate regional labor markets. (Some regressions were also run for gross migration, however. These results are available from the author upon request.) Note, however, that using net migration we lose half of the observations since net migration is equal (but oppositely signed) between any pair of sending and receiving regions.}\]

\[^{15}\text{Indeed a specification with fixed effects of the sending and receiving regions, may be considered a restricted version of the bilateral fixed effects specification (Hui/Wall 2001).}\]

\[^{16}\text{We use the previous two years when three lags are unavailable.}\]

\[^{17}\text{Data on employment rates and GDP per capita for the NUTS I and NUTS II regions were provided by Cambridge Econometrics, for the NUTS III regions of Denmark, Estonia, and Slovenia these data were taken from the Eurostat Cronos database.}\]
regional disparities in the respective countries. The table thus indicates that both regional GDP per capita and employment rate disparities in the candidate countries and new member states are by and large comparable with those in most EU15 member states. Furthermore, the table shows that the within variance of our dependent variables is rather low. This would lead us to expect that a large share of the variance in regression (5) can be explained by fixed effects and thus supports our attempt to check for robustness of results excluding bilateral fixed effects.

Table 7 presents the results of the regression with bilateral fixed effects. It suggests that net migration rates respond moderately to economic variables in the EU15 member states. For most of the EU15 countries analyzed (all but Italy and Denmark) we find a significant or at least marginally significant impact of regional per capita income disparities on migration. Furthermore, for some of the countries (Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) the coefficients of employment rate disparities are significant or on the verge of significance. For Belgium, however, we obtain a very robust positive and significant coefficient, which suggests that in Belgium migration occurred from regions with high employment rates to regions with low employment rates. Coefficients of the differences in the variability of GDP by contrast attain significance only in the case of the Netherlands. This suggests that in contrast to the more distant migration analyzed in Bentivogli/Pagano (1999) risk aversion plays only a minor role in the decision to migrate within a country.

For the candidate countries and new member states, we find that per capita GDP differences are significant and with the expected sign only for Hungary. For Poland and Slovenia they are significant but have an unexpected sign, suggesting that migrants move from high income to low income regions in these countries. For all the other countries GDP differences remain insignificant. Furthermore, differences in employment rates are significant and with the expected sign only for Slovenia, and significant but with an unexpected sign for Hungary. These results thus suggest that migration in the candidate countries and new member states is somewhat less responsive to regional income disparities than in EU15 member states.

The most robust result for both candidate countries and new member states and EU15 member states is, however, that bilateral fixed effects explain the majority of the variation in gross place-to-place migra-
tion. $R^2$ values after including GDP differentials, employment rate differentials and differences in GDP variation mostly increase by 1 to 2 percentage points relative to a specification with only bilateral fixed effects. This suggests that a substantial part of gross migration in both the EU15 countries and candidate countries and new member states is driven by factors other than economic motives.

For this reason we also estimated equation (6) using fixed effects of the sending and receiving regions. The results (see Table 8) reconfirm many of the previous findings. In particular net migration in most EU15 member states is significantly correlated with regional per capita GDP disparities but insignificantly correlated with these disparities in candidate countries and new member states. As before we obtain

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18 We also performed a number of robustness checks for this regression. In particular we excluded the differences in GDP variability, and experimented with specifications including distance between sending and receiving regions, as well as lagged variables to reduce potential endogeneity (see Table A1 in the appendix). None of this changes the qualitative results.
significant coefficients with an unexpected sign in a number of candidate countries and new member states as well as Belgium, and differences in the variation of GDP are also insignificant as a rule in both EU15 member states and candidate countries and new member states. Including fixed effects of the sending and receiving regions, however, increases the size of the estimated parameter in a number of countries and reduces the R² values of the regressions. As before, however, dummy variables still explain a substantial part of the variation of net migration.

### Table 8

**Estimation results of equation (6) dependent variable net migration: sending and receiving region dummies included**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP differences</th>
<th>Employment rate differences</th>
<th>Differences in variability of GDP</th>
<th>R² NOBS</th>
<th>R² only dummies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria 1996–1999</td>
<td>28.611**</td>
<td>–10.840</td>
<td>–0.109</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.911)</td>
<td>(10.726)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(143)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1993–1999</td>
<td>5.026**</td>
<td>–2.950</td>
<td>–0.038</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.394)</td>
<td>(3.563)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(380)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark 1995–1999</td>
<td>–4.123</td>
<td>7.570*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.638)</td>
<td>(4.350)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(522)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1990–1993</td>
<td>7.346*</td>
<td>–2.314</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.962)</td>
<td>(5.424)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(230)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain 1999–1999</td>
<td>4.448**</td>
<td>5.262***</td>
<td>–0.208</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.224)</td>
<td>(1.554)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(938)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 1990–1999</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>4.610***</td>
<td>–0.059*</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.382)</td>
<td>(2.165)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(592)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy 1990–1996</td>
<td>–3.922</td>
<td>4.259**</td>
<td>–0.061**</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.216)</td>
<td>(1.687)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(614)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 1991–1996</td>
<td>9.110***</td>
<td>16.111***</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.313)</td>
<td>(5.697)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 1993–1999</td>
<td>–3.084</td>
<td>11.563</td>
<td>–0.129</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.858)</td>
<td>(7.978)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(194)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia 1990–1999</td>
<td>–6.984</td>
<td>–9.314</td>
<td>–0.032</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.552)</td>
<td>(9.209)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 1990–1999</td>
<td>–1.598</td>
<td>–4.150</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.998)</td>
<td>(2.653)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(168)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 1995–1999</td>
<td>–1.727</td>
<td>–0.023</td>
<td>–0.043</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.088)</td>
<td>(8.943)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(598)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1995–1999</td>
<td>–7.833**</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.715)</td>
<td>(3.992)</td>
<td>(0.477)</td>
<td>(149)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Dependent variable: net migration rates as a percentage of the population.
- Estimates for Italy and Spain exclude the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, Sicily and Sardinia.
- 
- 
- **( )* ( )** signify significance at the 1% (5%) and (10%) level respectively.
- Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimate.
- b) Values in brackets are Numbers of Observations (NOBS).

### 3.1 A decomposition

We thus conclude that migration is less responsive to regional disparities in candidate countries and new member states than in most EU15 member states, where the most important difference is the lower responsiveness of candidate-country and new member state migration to disparities in per capita GDP levels. To quantify the effect of these differences on migration in the candidate countries and new member states relative to the EU15 we perform a decomposition, in which we estimate the increase in net migra-
tion that would occur if the responsiveness of migration to regional disparities were as high as in one of the EU15 member states.

Formally, this can be done by denoting \( a \) and \( b \) as estimates of the coefficients of income and wage disparities in a particular member state. The relative increase in total migration in the candidate country (new member state) (\( \Delta M \)) under the assumption that the responsiveness to wage and income disparities is equal to that in the EU15 member states, while all other factors remain equal, would then be given by:

\[
\Delta M = \sum \left( \frac{\sum_j \left( a_j \ln(u_{at}) + b_j \ln(c_{at}^2 - c_{ht}^2) \right)}{\sum \sum M_{at}} \right) - M_{at}
\]

where \( c \), \( \phi \), and \( \tau \) are the parameters estimated from equation (5) for the candidate countries and new member states and \( a_{EU} \), \( b_{EU} \), and \( c_{EU} \) are the estimated coefficients for a “benchmark” EU15 member state.

We perform this calculation for net migration using Spain, Italy and the Netherlands as baseline EU15 member states.\(^{19}\) The results (in Table 9) suggest that the lower responsiveness of migration to regional disparities in the candidate countries and new member states contributes to low internal migration. While these calculations should be interpreted with caution for most countries our calculations show that migration figures should more than double to reach western European levels in almost all candidate countries and new member states and should multiply by a factor of five to ten in a number of instances.\(^{20}\) Thus these calculations indicate a substantially lower level of net migration given regional disparities in new member states and candidate countries than in most EU15 member states.

### 4 Conclusions

This paper used data on inter-regional migration for 9 EU15 member states and 7 countries that either joined the European Union in 2004 or are negotiating membership, in order to compare regional migration patterns in these countries. Our most important results are first that inter-regional migration is low by EU15 standards in candidate countries and new member states and fell throughout the 1990s, and second that the responsiveness of migration to regional disparities is substantially lower in the member states than in the EU15. We predict that in a typical candidate country (new member state) net migration should increase by a factor of between 2 and more than 10 if the responsiveness of migration to regional disparities were comparable with that in the member states.

The findings thus suggest that low migration rates are one of the major obstacles to the equalization of regional disparities as well as to the effective absorption of asymmetric shocks in the candidate countries and new member states. On the policy side this clear-

\(^{19}\) This choice was guided by an attempt to use countries both from the north of the EU, with their relatively low aggregate unemployment rates and greater labor market flexibility and from the south, where unemployment rates are somewhat higher and labor market flexibility is lower.

\(^{20}\) Estimations conducted with gross migration rates suggest somewhat more modest differences: gross migration should be between 10% and 50% higher in candidate countries and new member states if the reaction of migration to regional disparities were similar to Spain, Italy or the Netherlands. Extreme increases are indicated throughout for the Czech Republic, where migration should increase by a factor of between 2 and 5. Slovene gross migration by contrast seems already to have converged to the levels of these countries.
ly suggests that policies designed to reduce barriers to migration in the candidate countries and new member states should be given a high priority. Unfortunately we are unable to answer the question as to why the responsiveness of migration is so low in the candidate countries and new member states, which could provide orientation as to which policies could be most helpful in increasing migration.

We would, however, argue that a policy framework to address the low internal migration rates in candidate countries and new member states should take a relatively broad view on migration and should encompass a multitude of factors such as housing and capital market imperfections (to overcome liquidity constraints), improving spatial matching and reviewing labor market institutions (in particular employment protection regulation). Clearly, for policy purposes it would be interesting to know which of these factors would be most effective at increasing the willingness to migrate. This, however, is beyond the evidence presented in this paper.

References


## Appendix

### Table A1

**Estimation results of equation (5) dependent variable net migration: lagged values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Lagged GDP differences</th>
<th>Lagged employment rate differences</th>
<th>Differences in variability of GDP</th>
<th>R²</th>
<th>NOBS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria 1996–1999</td>
<td>-3.239 (2.267)</td>
<td>1.000 (4.732)</td>
<td>0.157 (0.167)</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>(108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium 1993–1999</td>
<td>-3.969*** (0.970)</td>
<td>6.376**** (1.192)</td>
<td>-0.037 (0.045)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>(273)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark 1995–1999</td>
<td>0.254 (1.134)</td>
<td>-1.288 (2.381)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.000)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>(417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany 1990–1993</td>
<td>-2.855*** (0.798)</td>
<td>4.618 (2.307)</td>
<td>0.121 (0.090)</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>(175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain* 1990–1999</td>
<td>-3.371* (1.957)</td>
<td>-3.816* (1.384)</td>
<td>-0.038 (0.027)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>(835)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands 1990–1999</td>
<td>-1.082*** (0.456)</td>
<td>-4.375** (1.126)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>(526)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy† 1990–1996</td>
<td>-0.081 (0.507)</td>
<td>-6.652*** (1.332)</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>(679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 1991–1996</td>
<td>-1.912* (1.094)</td>
<td>-2.938 (3.188)</td>
<td>-0.106* (0.059)</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>(159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic 1993–1999</td>
<td>-1.602*** (0.560)</td>
<td>11.837**** (4.519)</td>
<td>-0.137 (0.086)</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>(166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia 1990–1999</td>
<td>3.327 (3.961)</td>
<td>-15.571 (11.863)</td>
<td>-0.419 (1.195)</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>(30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary 1990–1999</td>
<td>-1.214*** (0.379)</td>
<td>3.017*** (0.639)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.042)</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>(128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland 1995–1999</td>
<td>0.485 (0.486)</td>
<td>2.037*** (0.644)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.034)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>(478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia 1995–1999</td>
<td>2.996 (2.579)</td>
<td>-2.087 (2.923)</td>
<td>-0.068 (0.272)</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>(140)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Dependent variable: net migration rates as a % of the population.
- a) Estimates for Italy and Spain exclude the Canaries, the Balearic Islands, Sicily and Sardinia.
- **** (*) (*) signify significance at the 1% (5%) and (10%) level respectively. Values in brackets are standard errors of the estimate.
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