Title: Welfare State, familistic culture and women’s employment in the Southern European countries: The key issues to activate women’s employment.

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Introduction

Analysis on family change in Europe have revealed a clear interdependence between institutional frameworks, where family policies are developed, and labour and family strategies adopted by persons to integrate into the labour market.

In the case of southern European countries, such as Spain, the restricted democratic Welfare State model developed after the dictatorship of Franco didn’t try to promote comprehensive family policies, due to the importance of family as flagship of the previous dictatorial regime. This fact negatively affected the definition and settings of family policies directed to favour gender equality in work and family responsibilities, therefore contributing to reproduce the traditional gender role model and family relations model.

In fact, there is a lack of family policies related to childcare services in southern European countries. This has reinforced the traditional family model, in terms of adopted labour and family strategies as well as in terms of gender roles such as the role of mothers, fathers and female workers.

In the Spanish Welfare State, existent connections between limited actions developed in the field of family policies and the reproduction of a cultural model linked to the traditional family in the social imaginary is evident, as highlighted by numerous researchers. These values and attitudes embedded in the so-called “familistic” cultural model have developed towards traditional gender roles and labour and family attitudes that somehow explain low labour participation of females, as well as the gender gap in the distribution of home tasks; females face a moral dilemma regarding the acceptance of family responsibilities assigned to their gender role and the challenge of assuming economic costs of not entering the labour market within an institutional context that hasn’t sufficiently favoured conciliation of work and family.

This leads us to state that culture is a complex sum of values, attitudes and norms resulting of reciprocal institutional action on individual actions. In the case of this study, this reasoning could to some extent explain existent variations in female employment and family strategies in different western countries. In definite, culture, defined in this case as gender roles, would explain individual preference models that have been socially built through actions taken by institutions such as the Market or the State. In fact, a more recent article by Fortin (2005) uses the World Value Surveys to show that gender role and work attitudes help to explain women’s employment and fertility outcomes for twenty five OCDE countries.

However, a deep analysis of the desired family ideals sorted by sex, age or level of education shows that a process of change has started in Spain; similar to the process happened in Scandinavian countries in past decades. Therefore, effects that institutions have on the collective social imaginary with regard to processes of family change have a limited reach if we take factors such as age and level of education into account. Although it is true that we move in the field of preferences and these are partially
determined by the effects of institutions and culture; preferences are not always an accurate reflection of behaviours adopted by persons. In any case, the analysis of preferences can help to identify future change trends. In the case of Spain, people’s preferences in terms of family models and gender relations do not show real daily behaviours adopted by persons. On the one hand, they seem advanced in terms of the family model they wish for, but they reproduce traditional family models. This ambivalence can be explained as a result of social and institutional effects on individual actions. As for Spain, this distance between the desired model and the real family model is especially interesting in order to study individual factors (such as sex, age, level of education) that determine preferences beyond determining institutional factors. These analyses allow us to identify future trends in family change, difficult to find through social macro-analyses.

In definite, this article’s main objective is to explain, on the one side, differential incidence of family policies on the setup of values and attitudes regarding work and family in different European countries.

**We share the idea of Mayer (2004) and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (2006) stating that the process of globalization creates challenges and adjustments in all countries, while interacting with institutions and cultural systems, partially contributing to neutralize existent differences between different Nation-Sates in terms of values and labour and family strategies.**

In this paper I contribute to this debate by focusing on the women’s family and labour dilemmas in Spain within the comparative context of the Welfare State. I suggest that the processes of individualization and gender roles change in Spain will be studied in the institutional and cultural context of reduced family policies and the persistence of the traditional family.

1.- Understanding family, gender roles change and employment behaviour: Individual choices versus social structure in the framework of Welfare State

As for the analysis of the complex factor framework that links fertility, family change and female employment in different European countries with regard to the process of individualization, many questions arise which have not been answered in economic and sociological analyses. In fact, new interpretations are made that try to include not only strictly economic and sociological factors, but also cultural factors such as preferences, values and differential use of time by family members from a comparative perspective.

The current debate on the nature of family change has centred on the concept of “late modernity”. It is argue that “new modernity” is characterized by increased reflexivity, and processes of individualization. Individualization is a term used by Beck-Gernsheim (2002) and Bauman (2003) in the sense of a social process with the component of the individual choices, leaded by the personal motivation for the pursuit of the new forms of intimacy, where the structural changes are not the fact to make the social agent react but he can really entitle the change by himself.

In this context, “choice biographies” emerge whereby individuals make decision about their own lives rather than following and predetermined (by class, gender, ethnicity) standard biography. The “individualization thesis” has some implications for
individuals and families. This characterization of late modernity open a new type of family know as “negotiated family”, where domestic divisions of labour emerge form a process of negotiation of both genders which now co-exits with the “traditional family” with its clearly defined gender division of labour based on ascribed roles (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2003; Beck- Gernsheim 2002).

In this interpretational context, Hakim’s analysis about family life-styles is interesting in a sense: in order to explain the differences observed in family change between countries. The theory of preferences tried to identify life-style preferences using the effects of gender roles on labour and family choices made by females and males in different European countries. This theoretical perspective identifies three distinctive groups of females: a big group of females named “adaptatives”, that try to combine employment and family and do not permanently prioritise any of these two aspects, and two smaller groups, whose life is focused either on a professional career or on family and household. According to Hakim (2005), people’s perception about their identity as main earners of the family (shared role), as secondary earners or as dependent persons is shaped by the ideology of gender roles more than by the labour status.

Most criticism for the classes created by Hakim is related to the difficulty of reducing female preferences to only three interpretation models, in a context of a complex reality that does not allow such classifications. Furthermore, critics point out that this type of classifications cannot rigorously apprehend the complexity of gender roles, since they only reflect the institutional, cultural and social context where they were developed (Crompton and Lyonette, 2005; Smart and Shipman, 2004; Duncan, 2006). Some researches also shows that the individualization thesis is limited in the sense that individuals remain embedded in social and cultural networks -in the form of gendered beliefs about the proper thing to do- provides the context within which social actors make decision about their lives (Smart and Shipman, 2004; Duncan and Smith, 2002). According to Crompton (2006) and Duncan embedded normartive and material patterns still persist and have continuing power. “As far as women are concerned, one of the most significant elements of embedded traditionalism is the persistence of the ideology of domesticity, in which the work of caring is normatively assigned to woman” (Crompton, 2006:10).

However, this perspective of the analysis is useful in order to explain to what extent family change is not only the result of social effects on individual actions, but also how individual motivations and aspirations developed to answer challenges created by the environment can, in many cases, contribute to modify their own social environment.

In any case, it is obvious that individuals define their individual strategies regarding work and family in contexts socially determined by actions of the States, their position in the social structure and the incidence of cultural normative contexts. Although these arguments are part of the theory of individualization, motivation and individual aspirations are considered more important when it comes to interpret social behaviours than structural determinations, which has raised criticism. From my point of view the integration of both perspectives is not only desirable, but also essential to explain social and family change trends.
A context in which globalization determines, on the one side, individual options and decisions and, on the other side, forces institutions in different national contexts to adopt different actions for similar challenges that are related to the demographic cost of declining fertility, the economic value of unequal distribution of family responsibilities, the availability of individual options to enter the labour market and the power to cope with the challenge of optimizing conciliation of family tasks and paid work (Mayer, 2004). Hans-Peter Blossfeld (2006: 13) defines this process as follows: “Relevant institutions that shape women’s labour market responses to globalization include the welfare regime with its particular labour market and family policies, the education system that regulates re-entering into the labour market, employment relation systems and family and cultural systems”.

The opinion of researchers such as Pfau-Effinger (2004), who considers labour and family strategies adopted by females in each country as a combined result of culture, institutions and their own social practices is located in an intermediate position. For Pfau-Effinger (2004), institutions and culture form the context in which social practices of individuals are developed and where existent family and gender structures may be reproduced and changed. In short, Pfau-Effinger’s “gender arrangement” theory says that strategies adopted by individuals towards gender relations are the result of negotiation processes between individuals in historically determined cultural and institutional networks. The truth is that Pfau-Effinger refers to the fact that social behaviour is a “social building”, resulting of a negotiation of each individual with themselves, where culture and the institutional context play an important role; the individual takes an individual decision, always in an institutional and cultural reference context. However, Hakim and his followers consider that, in modern society, individuals are free to choose and build their preferences without institutional determinism, although they do admit a certain influence of the cultural framework in the definition of preferences. In fact, numerous researches in favour of the theory of preferences confirmed the existence of significant disparities among different female ethnic groups with regard to labour orientation and preferences in each country, although the institutional context is the same for all social groups (Dale and Holdsworth, 1998; Hakim, 2005). This highlights how important cultural networks are in building strategies and attitudes, independently of the institutional reference context.

Therefore, from this perspective, actors not only adopt strategies depending on rational action principles, but also depending on other factors such as cultural models (gender roles) and welfare state policies. In fact, the role of the Welfare State cannot be underestimated, because it contributes to the reproduction and changing of cultural models associated to family, employment and families’ division of work through the distribution of resources. On the other hand, welfare state policies promote negotiations and interactions between groups in terms of differential access to resources provided by the State.

In the context of the new "negotiated family" it is possible to distinguish new trends regarding cooperation in and distribution of family tasks among couples. Most studies that tried to analyze the impact of employment on fertility considered males as main earners and, therefore, their participation in household tasks was limited. Only recently studies about the use of time have revealed new findings about the impact of the distribution of household tasks on fertility and female employment. According to studies carried out, mothers continue to spend more time than fathers doing household
tasks and childcare, although the gender gap in this field has decreased and the contribution of males to household tasks is more and more relevant. Graig (2006), using the ECHO data, has empirically shown that fertility ratios are higher in countries where time distribution of household work is more equitable between genders. Similarly, comparative studies by Apps and Rees (2005), Coke (2004), Sevilla Sanz (2006) and Güell; Esping Andersen and Brodmann (2005) prove that differences between countries regarding female employment and fertility can be explained not only by monetary factors, but also by factors such as the contribution of males to household tasks. Empirical analyses carried out by Esping Andersen for comparative studies of Spain and Denmark have shown that, in Spain, the decision of couples to have children is ultimately linked to the support offered by the partner, more than to the marginal cost for the couple’s income, more specifically, for the female’s income.

In northern European countries, such as Denmark or Sweden, the transition process initiated by parents from traditional family models and roles towards a cooperative childcare model had a decisive influence on the birth of a second child and, therefore, on fertility (Güell and Esping Andersen, 2005). Furthermore, and beyond the effects on fertility of education, income or economic support policies for families with children, the effects of public policies on the mentality and, therefore, on gender roles are to be highlighted.

In any case, this kind of analysis requires inclusion of the “gendered agency” (Shaver, 2002), as this theory allows to link individual strategies referred to work and family and the changes of social policies to actions of social and political movements. In this research, this analysis is obviated, as it would imply a detailed analysis of the role of feminist movements in Europe in the definition of “gendered agency”, which is not the study-object of this paper. However, it is necessary to highlight a brief analysis of the differences observed in this field between the familialism that characterizes Spanish policies opposed to individualized rights in the Finnish model. Such distinctions have led other authors to classify the two countries as still belonging to different care regimes—the public service model (coherent and optional familialism care regime) in the case of Finland, and the private family policy model (subsidiary and implicit familialism care regime) for Spain (Mahon, 2002; Lister, 2003).

Despite agreement that women’s movements are central actors in social policy change, few empirical studies have systematically examined the impact of women’s movements on social policy change.

Finland has been a pioneer in the development of political rights for women. In fact, Finnish women obtained their right to be eligible in 1906: On the other side, labour participation of females in Finland, as well as in other northern countries, has had a long tradition of citizen and institutional acknowledgement of females as mothers and workers due to, among other reasons, the agrarian tradition of this country, where most females have been working since before the development of post-industrial economies. This made it easier to include the concept of working-mother into individualized family policies developed by the Finnish State with the upcoming of modern economy (Sulkunen, 1991; Natkin, 1997; Anttonen, Henriksson & Natkin, 1994). Therefore, Finland has been at the top of the European countries when promoting individual social rights: child allowances, parental leave, public childcare provision, separate taxation for
spouses. 1960 was a decisive year, with the negotiation between institutions and social movements of a new “gender contract” (Julkunen, 1994), making work of mothers the norm and archetype of the so-called “citizen-mother-worker” (Hainen & Martishainen, 2001).

However, in Spain women’s movements had a weak presence, mainly due to its internal divisions. Spain combined social-care policy changes in two stages within a period of five years. Social-care policy change took place at the end of the 1990s. In 1998, Spain introduced part-time work protection legislation to overcome previous social security discrimination, and one year later a new law was enacted to promote conciliation of work and family (Escobedo 2001, 261). In Spain there has not been a tradition of women movements that were able to mobilise the citizenship and, therefore, with the capacity of defining and influencing social policies. Since 1980 a fragmented and growing women movement has developed, but lost action capacity when the socialist party didn’t win the elections in the 1990s. The autonomous movement held a marginal position (Roggeband 2004). During the last years, women movements mainly mobilized to act against gender violence, whereas the issue of social care policies received far less attention. During the last year, 2007, and as a consequence of the passing of progressive laws in terms of family policies by the Zapatero government, certain conservative sectors linked to the Catholic Church have activated a social movement in defence of the “traditional family”, and with the objective of mobilising the citizenship against these family policies passed by the socialist government. This fact shows the importance that family traditionalism still holds for certain social movements in Spain.

In Spain, couples still continue to follow the traditional family model. In fact, while in northern Europe countries the access of females to the labour market has meant an increase of male’s participation in household tasks, in southern European countries this has not happened yet. All this, plus restrictive family welfare policies, differences in salaries and labour condition, has negatively affected fertility and female employment in Spain.

With regard to the impact of family policies on female employment and fertility, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) and Del Boca and Locatelli (2006) have shown that, in this kind of analysis, it is important to take endogenous factors associated to family policies into account. In fact, similar policies have different effects on employment and fertility depending on the reference country. This is a result of the reciprocal influx of policies on preferences, since many times institutional decisions are a reflection of culturally determined preferences. Fact is, in northern European countries generous family policies are a consequence of collective preferences that demand gender equality, both in- and outside the household. However, in southern European countries, limited family policies can partially be attributed to the persistence of a traditional family model that has been historically in charge of providing services and support, perpetuating gender inequalities in family and employment and not giving incentives to create social movements that promote childcare and gender family policies.

An example for these theoretical thoughts is that in southern European countries there is little availability of care services for children under 3 years old and reduced supply of part-time jobs; this is partially a result of the value given to the role of family, mothers and working females by society. In fact, many people asked by the World Values Survey in southern European countries agreed with the expression “a working mother
can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who
does not work”. In fact, 80.6% of Spaniards agrees with this assertion and also 94.7% of
the Finns from the last benchmark year of this survey (2000). In a survey carried out in
2006 for Spain, 37.9 of the interviewed agreed with the expression “Children may have
some sort of affective deficiency if their mothers work” while men remain in a higher
percentage (46.7%) compared to women (32.85) in favour of this expression. In any
case, these data demonstrate the persistence of traditional stereotypes on gender roles
for Spain.

In short, as pointed out by Beck-Gernsheim (2003); Esping Andersen (2002) and López
Blasco (2006), among other authors, we are in an ambivalent and contradictory process
of family change, with people trying to adapt to the process of individualization in the
new modernity. These changes require a new gender and intergenerational social
contract that allows families, States and markets to adapt to the new economic, social
and institutional environment.

This epistemological discussion is carried out in a process of growing individualization
that characterizes modern societies, with individuals having to define their personal
biographies beyond the inherited normative and institutional determinants that define
culture. But I think that behaviours are a result of social effects, normative structures
and individual preferences. In this context, conciliation (preferences and strategies) is
analyzed in relation with family models and conciliation policies developed in each
welfare regime. In Southern European countries, this pattern becomes even more visible
in the sharing of house-work and the expectations by males and females with regard to
domestic tasks and paid jobs. In this way a gendered life course was institutionalized in
the domains of the family, economy and State (Moreno Mínguez, 2007; Ferrarini, 2006;
Charles and Harris, 2007). In Spain, for instance, men’s life course was institutionalized
within the occupational framework while women’s life course was the product of the
institutionalized motherhood still (Charles and Harris, 2007: 281). Familism is probably
one of the most interesting concepts for our research. According to these publications,
family has acted as an informal security network during the last years, offering care-
services for children, older and sick people; services provided by the state in other
countries. This has contributed to reinforce family solidarity between generations, as
well as to create a broad family network. The negative compensation of this family
economy model has affected the female collective. To take care of the family, they
could not access the labour market. The institutional process of familiarization of family
policies has led to a distinctive gender regime (with informal rules) in which females
were considered caretakers in a traditional family role and a single earner family was
promoted (Saraceno, 1995; Trifiletti, 1999; Moreno Mínguez, 2005).

Limited labour and family conciliation policies combined to a cultural context of
intense familism that is dominant in these countries has led to a family model
characterized by a traditional family with traditional family roles; dilemmas regarding
conciliation of family and career are discussed in private.

However, preferences and ideals of the desired roles and the family model do not seem
to coincide with family strategies adopted in these countries, which indicate that there is
a transition process towards a more egalitarian family model, often limited by the
institutional context. In fact, Del Boca and Sauer’s simulation model (2006) applied to
Spain and Italy has shown that labour participation of females with children could
increase substantially if family services grew and costs were lowered. Hakim (2000; 2006) studied changes happened in individual preferences with regard to dominant family forms and desired family models. Analyses carried out by Hakim regarding family life-style preferences show the type of work and of conciliation strategies chosen by people in Spain and the United Kingdom. In Spain, there seems to be a great gap between the desired preference of most females towards an egalitarian family model and reality, where most females with children do not work.

Therefore, the Spanish case allows the hypothesis that the difficulties to conciliate family and professional career are a result of limited family policies; and this conditions the options of females to access the labour market, as well as the chosen labour option.

Studies carried out in relation to desired family models agree to highlight that the opinion of Spanish people tends to favour egalitarian families where both couple members do work and the roles are equalled. This seems to prove the fact that familistic tradition and traditional gender roles culture have less and less importance in the creation of the ideals of family. However, these attitudes do not fit into the family practice of Spanish people, characterized by traditional behaviours in terms of sharing household tasks and incorporating females into the labour market. Quantitative and qualitative studies carried out in this field show the existent polarization between attitudes and chosen life-styles (Navarro, 2006; Tobio, 2005). This paradox has been explained by Tobio (2001) mentioning that young couples, concretely young females, still have very ambivalent perceptions, even contradictory perceptions, about family roles and responsibilities, in spite of accepting the “egalitarian relations” rhetoric. We should also add that an institutional context of limited support to mothers and young female workers has reinforced existent contradictions regarding new family roles and models.

The last hypothesis referred to the Spanish case is linked to the previous one and refers to the fact that globalization processes created by the market in terms of standard family and labour models are in contradiction with cultural and institutional models embedded in southern European countries, which leads to ambivalent processes in terms of attitudes and preference systems. At the same time, this process of globalization mostly affects young people, educational systems, etc. and tends to standardize behaviours and neutralize institutional and cultural differences between countries, depending on the educational level and the age group. In fact, we state the hypothesis that education and age homogenize motivations and behaviours regarding wished and chosen family and labour models across different countries, independently of the institutional and cultural context. But it is also true that this process of globalization has not managed to homogenize existent differences regarding attitudes and behaviours depending on the position in the social structure. Fact is that the incidence of culture and the institutional framework, as well as less possibilities to choose from, become visible for those that are in a disadvantaged position within the social structure in all national contexts. However, it is needed to highlight that in those countries with a strong Welfare State, such as Finland, importance of education and income is not as great as in countries with a weaker Welfare State in terms of family policies, such as the case of Spain.

In any case, it seems evident that, as displayed by Hakim (2005), different groups of family and labour preferences do exist; in the case of southern European countries these preferences do not correspond with the adopted family strategies, due to the difficulties
faced by couples to conciliate family and professional career, among others. That is why, in Spain, it would be interesting to analyse if observed non-synchronies between manifested values and adopted strategies are a result of life-styles and family life-forms “pluralization” processes and, therefore, a result of a late modernization process; or, on the contrary, a result of the continuance of traditional stereotypes and models anchored in the collective social imaginary.

In southern European countries, such as Spain, it is possible to observe a certain ambivalence regarding family roles adopted by males and females in employment and family, since they are in favour of an egalitarian family model, but at the same time they consider females should prioritize family and not work (Tobio, 2005; Fernández Cordón y Tobío, 2006). Therefore, the family roles theory referred to by Hakim (2005) does not seem very useful to explain family strategies adopted by Spanish couples, since preferences for an egalitarian life-style chosen by the majority of those that were surveyed do not correspond with gender roles daily reproduced in family households.

2. -Family, gender roles and employment in Southern Europe: The facts

This part will try to briefly explain, on a macro-level, how the articulation between family and employment, as well as the cultural building of gender relations vary depending on the type of welfare regime, and therefore on the family policies developed by each national State. Studies carried out about typologies of family policies coincide in underlining that the State’s actions directed to offer family services constitute variables that partially explain causal factors and effects on behaviour, e.g. impact of childhood services on female employment and family culture (Crompton, 2006: 116).

In this regard, a central characteristic pointed out when referring to families from southern Europe is a low female labour participation and, therefore, a small number of families with two earners. This fact has been linked to the lack of childcare in welfare regimes among southern European countries.

The analysis of the structure of spending in the field of social care benefits shows important differences between southern countries and the European average. While in 2004 average spending for family and childhood policies in the EU-15 as a percentage of the GDP was 2.1%, in Spain it was 0.7%, in Italy 1.1% and in Portugal 0.9%. On the contrary, Sweden and Finland spent 3% of their GDP. It is interesting to highlight that Spain, as well as Ireland, are the countries that have increased more their social spending directed to families during the period 2000-2004, which shows that a process of acknowledgement in public institutions has started, which shows the importance of reinforcing family policies for the citizenship.
Table 1
PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING DIRECT TO FAMILIES 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SPENDING</th>
<th>% OF GDP</th>
<th>INCREASE 2000-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAMCE</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although it is true that Spain, along with Italy, are the countries that invest less in family services, it is also true that during the last years Spain has substantially increased the percentage of children under 3 years old that go to state-funded childcare facilities. In spite of this growth, Spain is still one of the countries with the lowest percentage of children under 3 year olds in childcare facilities when compared to countries such as Finland or Sweden. The availability of childcare facilities does not answer the question of whether demand is fully met. The actual demand for childcare is influenced by the participation rate of parents (mothers), the levels of unemployment, the length of parental leave, the opening hours of school and the availability of alternatives like grandparents and/or other informal arrangements, such as in Spain.

According to the table 2 in Southern Europe countries the percentage of children under three years who are in childcare is quite low compare with Nordic countries such Sweden and Denmark and it is characterized by greater rigidity in the number of weekly hours available. For this reason the extended family is very important in South Europe where it represents an important substitute for formal childcare. On the other hand, the low available childcare in these countries has important negatives effects on women’s employment and fertility.
Table 2

CHILDCARE IN EUROPE FOR CHILDREN AGE THREE, 2003-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coverage %</th>
<th>Public Social Spending on Childcare (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Education Database, OECD Social Expenditures Database, 2007; Eurostat, 2004

While the timing of the increase in female labour force participation has varied across countries, all countries have been affected. Nevertheless, differences in the levels of female participation remain large: among women aged 25 to 54 the level ranges from 60% or less in Southern European countries (with the exception of Portugal) to more than 80% in Nordic and some Eastern European countries. The differences in participation rates for this age group of women explain much of the variation in aggregate participation rates across OECD countries (Burniaux, Duval and Jaumotte 2003).

Higher rates of employment among women have been driven by changes in both the structure of the economy (the shift from agriculture and manufacturing to services) and the characteristics of women (including rising education, changing preferences for work outside the home and higher female wages), as well as falling male earnings and lower certainty of continuous employment for men (Pettit and Hook, 2002). Entering the labour force has also represented the most effective way for mothers to ensure themselves and their children against the vicissitudes of relationships and of work. As divorce rates and job insecurity rise, the male breadwinner model has become less and less reliable as a guarantee for children’s future. Patterns of maternal employment vary widely across countries. On average, nearly 83.3% of mothers with one child and 78% of mothers with two or more children are employed in 2003 in Norway. However in Spain only 54.4% of the mothers with one child and 47.4% with two or more children are employed in that date. When the child is under the age of 6, maternal employment rates are lower in Southern European countries (OECD, 2007). Increasingly, public policy aims to encourage both parents, and particularly mothers, to stay in paid
employment for reasons that include promotion of gender equity, a better use of labour market resources, and poverty alleviation.

To some extent, these outcomes for children and their families have reflected the influence of social policy programmes in most European countries. In the case of the Southern European countries, the high rate of one earner families is partly related with the precariousness of the family policies and the difficulties that women have to be adequately integrated in the labor market.

The following diagram shows the different ways couples organise labour. In comparison with other countries such as Finland or the Netherlands, Spain and Italy present high percentages of families with only one economic earner. This fact evidences the existence of structural factors (political and familiar) that contribute to promoting the permanence of this male breadwinner model in Southern European countries. A comparison of the organisation of labour schedules in families reveals important differences between the previously mentioned countries, relative to family and labour strategies adopted to balance work and family. In the Netherlands there is a marked high percentage of couples where the man works full-time while the woman works part-time, since they have chosen this intermediate formula, which has been well accepted by society in order to balance work and family. On the other hand, it is also worth noting the high number of families with two economic earners in Finland, where the welfare state has chosen as a result to favour female employment through the development of family and gender policies that balance work and family life.

![Chart 1: Families and Kind of Work by the Members, Couples Aged 20-49 (2003)](chart1)

An alternative to the “male breadwinner/mom at home” model is the “dual-earner/ dual-carer” model. This envisions an arrangement in which men and women engage symmetrically in both paid work and unpaid care-giving in the home. Also, this model
places primary responsibility for the care of very young children in the home, rather than in the hands of out-of-home carers; and, since there are now two “breadwinners”, it makes possible shorter average work hours (i.e. less than a 40-hour standard) throughout the life cycle. While the “dual-earner/dual-carer” model has not been fully realised anywhere, reforms in several Nordic countries have explicitly stressed paternal engagement in caregiving – via the enactment of “use-or-lose” portions of parental leave, the expansion of high-quality part-time work for both parents and a shortening of the standard full-time work week – as well as provision of a continuum of support provided to parents with young children (OCDE, 2006: 88). In the Netherlands, the 2000 Work and Care Act aims to enable couples to hold “one and a half jobs” between them – with each holding a “three-quarter time job” – thus achieving both gender equality and time for care (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2000).

However, in the Southern European countries, the institutional policies have contributed to reinforce the male bread-winner model. This family policy model has not only had negative repercussions on the children's life conditions, but also in the unequal division of the family work by sex. In fact, the scarce policies of labour and family life balance developed by these Welfare States, as well as the rigidity of the labour market and the salary inequality have discouraged women with children to incorporate to the labour market. Even when the woman works she feels the moral obligation of taking care of the children and of carrying out the housework, while the man becomes the main bread-winner. This social imaginary collective has come out on an unequal distribution of the domestic work between men and women in the Southern European countries.

As it can be seen in the chart 2, women dedicate more time to household tasks than men in all countries. The average time women spend on household tasks is seven times what men do. The countries that seem to have a more equal division of labour between men and women in these tasks are Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom, while the countries with the greatest difference in this division are Spain and Italy. Therefore, this data reveals the unequal division of family labour in the Southern European countries in comparison with the Northern European countries, suggesting a link between the welfare state’s policies on gender, female employment and family roles.
Therefore these familist policies have contributed to reproduce a cultural model of family and gender roles based on traditional gender stereotypes that hinder the family change in the southern European countries. An indicator that shows this delay in the individualization process is the perception that women in these countries have with regard to their own role as workers and mothers. Comparative European data from the European Social Survey show that the most deeply rooted traditional family values are found in citizen’s living in what has been called a conservative and Mediterranean welfare state. Only 14.7% of the Danish and 18.6% of Swedish people agree with the following expression: “Women should stop working when they have a child,” in comparison to 43% of the Spanish, 54.5% of the Portuguese and 39.7% of the Germans interviewed in 2004 (see table 3).
Table 3
% OF AGREEMENT WITH THE EXPRESSION "WOMAN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO CUT DOWN ON PAID WORK FOR THE SAKE OF FAMILY" BY SEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORDIC COUNTRIES / SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENMARK</td>
<td>14,7</td>
<td>17,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>21,0</td>
<td>17,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY</td>
<td>23,2</td>
<td>24,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>18,6</td>
<td>21,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIBERAL ANGLO-SAXON MODEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>37,6</td>
<td>39,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>41,8</td>
<td>43,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATIVE MODEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>34,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>39,7</td>
<td>38,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td>33,2</td>
<td>30,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUXEMBOURG</td>
<td>48,0</td>
<td>45,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSERVATIVE MODEL IN TRANSITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>30,7</td>
<td>31,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>24,9</td>
<td>25,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES / FAMILIST MODEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>33,6</td>
<td>29,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>43,0</td>
<td>45,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td>54,5</td>
<td>56,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations from the European Social Survey 2004

Another indicator allowing us to measure the change in family and gender roles is the perception on the children socialization when both parents work in Spain. First of all, the following diagram shows some marked differences by sex and age. People over 35 years old, more often disagree with the following statement than youngsters less than 35: “Children may have some sort of affective deficiency if their mothers work”. This suggests that for young people there are gender stereotypes that still remain associated with traditional family roles. In terms of gender, we again see women’s ambivalence, since it is surprising to see that 24% of women less than 35 years old disagree with that statement, even though this percentage increases considerably with women 35 and up. It is also worth noting that men in all age groups, in greater percentages than women, consider that children may suffer from an affective deficiency if the mother works. This consideration is placing us in an environment where women are more quickly ascribing to family changes than men, and therefore, to equal work at home.
Moreover, in the Spanish study, we can see the women’s ambivalence on their roles as mothers and workers. 19.6% of the women interviewed say that women should leave work temporarily in order to take care for their children. This percentage goes up to 27.4% when asking men. Most of women (70.4%) has preference towards an intermediate formula of part-time employment in order to continue taking care of the children. Only 11.4% of the women interviewed think they should return to work as soon as possible and take the children to childcare centres (see chart 4). These responses coincide with Tobío’s interpretation (2006) on the ambivalence of working Spanish mothers, as well as with Hakim’s preferences theory, on pluralism of lifestyles. These data demonstrate the weight of how traditional values define gender roles in Southern European countries, thus also revealing their importance in family models.
In definite, and as a summary of this section it can be concluded that, regarding the Spanish case, the institutional trend towards a restrictive Welfare State in the field of family policies during the democratic transition in the eighties contributed to reproduce a familistic culture inherited of the Franco regime in the context of the maintenance of the traditional family model, with a single salary earner and the role of mothers as main care-takers and socializing agents of minors. On the other side, this restrictive model of individualized family policies has reinforced an unequal gender relation model where family responsibilities fundamentally fall on females, which leads to an unequal distribution of domestic tasks between males and females within the family.

Therefore, the most expressive indicator of the incidence of institutional factors in the continuity of traditional behaviour models in Spain in the field of employment and family are the ambivalence and the existent moral dilemma in gender roles before the birth of the so-called “new negotiated family”. In the case of northern European countries, such as Finland, where a historical, institutional tradition of support for families with dual earners and working mothers exists, these dilemmas are nearly inexistent. In this country, “negotiated family” seems to be more a reality than a wish, which doesn’t mean that these countries don’t have other kinds of problems related to
the disappearance of “family solidarity” in favour of the “institutional family”, but this is not the study object in this article.

Conclusions

Most researches carried out about the family change refer to economic and demographic factors. However, during the last decades, institutional and cultural variables that link the access of females to the labour market and the change of gender roles, family policies and preferences have been introduced.

In this article we presented, on a macro level, how institutional effects (family policies) favour or limit the creation of new labour and family strategies linked to the development of preferences and values related to gender relations, female employment and family in different European countries. In the second part of the paper, we changed the perspective of the study introducing the statistical analysis of segmentation in Spain and Finland with the aim of estimating the incidence of individual factors like age, education or income, among other variables, in terms of preferences for family models in two countries with very different institutional contexts (Spain and Finland). In definite, the objective was to evaluate to which extent institutional and individual factors interact in the development of cultural models that explain existent differences in preferences and family and labour strategies adopted by citizens. The theoretical model used here has tried to join structural and institutional factors with individual factors in order to explain values and preferences of individuals regarding family, gender relations and employment. With this in mind we have taken into account contributions of the theory of individualization regarding the importance of competences, motivations and resources available to individuals to take their decisions (Bauman, 2002; Beck) and existent interlinkings between agency and structure (Giddens, 1984). Taking this debate as a reference, we have combined contributions of the theory of preferences and family life-styles by Hakim (2005), for whom preferences of family models depend on personal options, with the structural theory by Crompton and Ducan that states that individual preferences and specific gender roles are the result of cultural and institutional determinations.

In fact, the research presented in this paper points to the existence of substantial differences between northern and southern European countries regarding processes of family change in the so-called “context of individualization” in the late modernization. As for northern European countries, family change was defined by development of generous family and gender policies that have facilitated the incorporation of females into the labour market and the participation of males in household tasks. In these countries, the change in values towards family and employment and the change of the institutional context followed a parallel way. In fact, in Sweden or Finland the transition process from a traditional model towards an egalitarian family model in the context of individualization has been accepted and put into practice by parents as well as by institutions, as reflected by the data regarding family policies and values and attitudes towards family, female work and household tasks. However, in southern European countries such as Spain, the transition process is ambivalent, since the weight of tradition and familistic values is still relevant to the strategies adopted by people. Whereas slow progress is being made regarding gender policies and females are progressively entering the labour market, cultural values remain anchored in the
traditional gender relation model, as the data related to strategies adopted towards
division of household tasks, role of mothers and female workers and conciliation of
family and career shows. On that issue, reciprocal effects of family policies on the
shaping of preferences and values are to highlight. In fact, in northern European
countries, family and gender policies are a reflection of collective preferences towards
the egalitarian model of family and gender roles. On the contrary, in southern European
countries, weak family and gender policies put into practice until now could be both the
cause and the consequence of the traditional life-styles still present in business
practices, in conciliation strategies and in familistic stereotypes regarding mother and
female worker roles, division of household tasks and expectations. This southern
European picture is completed with shortage and lack of childcare services and
dependence of public administration.
References


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